

GERMAN PLANS

for the

NEXT WAR

BY

J. B. W. GARDINER



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The Military Critic of the "N. Y. Times"



MAPS IN TEXT

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
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CHAPTER I

GERMAN AIMS IN EUROPE AND ASIA

THE development of the present German Empire into the great but unscrupulous power which planned and initiated the Great War began with the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. This was the beginning of the Prussian lust for power and conquest, the beginning of the policy of aggression which found its crystallization in 1914.

Immediately after defeating Austria, Prussia formed the North German Confederation, a loose and unstable combination of the German states, merely as a necessary step in the development of German power in Europe. This combination was not intended to be permanent; it had none of the characteristics of a permanent organization. But it was necessary as a preparatory measure, preparing the German mind for a

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more closely knit union of states which was to follow.

The plan was Prussia's, and Prussia meant to assume the lead, meant to be the dominating element in all Germany. The other states needed to become accustomed to Prussia's leading strings before the eventual permanent state was formed.

The final step was soon taken. Gathering clouds of war with France furnished both the reason and the excuse, and under the guidance of Prussia, the North German Confederation was turned into the German Empire. The war with France taught the new German Empire that war could be an extremely profitable enterprise.

The taste of power and of the fruits of victory which Germany obtained in 1871 soon developed into gluttonous desire. Under the guidance of Bismarck, the first to dream of Pan-Germany, the campaign for universal empire began.

The first step in the campaign was to educate the German people to the idea. This was done by intensive propaganda, which was launched by a school of philosophy headed by Nietzsche, a school which preached incessantly the righteousness of war for the sake of war, and the duty of a nation to wage war lest, in addition to the arts of

peace, a people should become weak and effeminate, and their progress retarded. "Ye shall love peace," said Nietzsche, "as a means to new wars: and the short peace rather than the long." And this summed up the dogma of the entire school of which he was such a powerful exponent.

This idea took root and soon there were hundreds of men in Germany expounding the same doctrine in the name of the Fatherland. Not a single avenue, which might lead to the extension of the idea of the righteousness of brute force, of the duty of might to overrule right, was neglected. In almost every leading university, in almost every school and from almost every pulpit these ideas were taught and disseminated, until all of Germany was rotten with their insidious poison. The Pan-German party therefore lived and thrived and with widely extended membership, spread over the entire empire, taking supremacy in all matters of state, in spite of the growth of socialism.

Under the present Kaiser, the Pan-German dream was reduced to a definite form and definite steps were taken to turn this dream into a reality. These steps consisted in secret preparations for war, a war which Germany proposed to launch

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as soon as she felt the chances for success were most favorable. The time was ripe in 1914 and the Serajevo incident furnished the excuse.

It is not the intention here to enter into a discussion of the origin of the great war. It is, indeed, unnecessary, since it has been proven beyond all doubt that the war owes its beginning to Germany, to German ambition, to German lust for power and gain. But in this connection, I will do no more than quote Maximilian Harden, who, in 1914, not only acknowledged the truth, but defended it.

"This war," he writes, "has not been forced on us by surprise; we desired it and were right to do so. Germany goes into it because of her immutable conviction that what she has accomplished gives her the right to wider outlets for her activities and more room in the world." These "wider outlets," this "more room in the world," are the dreams of the Pan-Germanist, the distinct aims for which Germany is now at war.

It is popularly considered that the Pan-Germanic doctrine led to an expansion of Germany only toward the east, that the Hamburg-Persian Gulf line, the line of the Oriental railroad and

its bordering lands, was the limit of German ambitions. This was the Pan-German ambition of 1895; it is not the ambition of 1912, the ambition which led Bernhardi, the disciple of Nietzsche, to plead for world power or downfall. This latter dream extended westward as well as eastward, to the coast of France and Belgium as well as to the shores of the Persian Gulf. This is borne out by the fact that Germany, who in her plans for war had carefully calculated every step, deliberately selected the western front as the main scene of military endeavor. A brief analysis of this selection will show why the conclusion that Germany intended to expand westward is inevitable.

At the outset we may lay down the undebatable theory of warring against coalitions, that the only way to win is, as Napoleon did on several occasions, break the coalition and defeat its component parts separately. In the particular case at hand, Germany found herself faced with France on the west and Russia on the east. Great Britain, Germany hoped might stay out of this war and would be attended to later. The logical move then was to strike against the weaker member of the enemy, defeat it, force a

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separate peace, and then turn on the other. Either wing, if struck suddenly with the full force of Germany, unhampered and undiverted by any danger from the other, would, before defensive mobilization could be effected, be crushed and crumpled like a house of cards.

Let us then examine the relative strength of eastern and western enemies of Germany on August 1, 1914, in order to determine on which front the logic of the situation demanded that Germany should strike. France, through her system of compulsory military service, was already well recruited. Her standing army was nearly a million men, and her plans for mobilization could bring to the colors an additional force equally as large. Moreover, having since 1871 had reason to fear Germany, she was more or less prepared for the struggle. There was the string of border fortresses for defense—Verdun, Nancy, Epinal, Belfort—stretching out from Luxemburg to the Swiss frontier blocking the passage of the Vosges mountains. There was an excellent system of railroads and highways, second not even to those of Germany, over which troops could be moved with great rapidity. There was a long sea coast studded with open

ports into which the factories of the world could pour their munitions, supplementing those of the industries of France. There was the French navy, second to that of Germany, possibly, but capable of protecting the country's shipping. Finally there was that intangible force—difficult to measure and to define but of incalculable value—the spirit of France, a spirit which Germany knew existed and which, in intensity, is not less strong than the German devotion to the Fatherland. Indeed this spirit had many times proven itself to be one of the most powerful forces in history; a force which never flags, that knows no defeat, that fights beyond the point where hope is dead,—and still wins.

These were, briefly, the forces, excluding Great Britain, which Germany had to face when she decided to strike to the west.

There were no such forces as these in Russia. The Russian bureaucracy, in the first place, was made up of men the great majority of whom were from the Baltic provinces and who were pro-Teuton in their sympathies rather than pro-Slav. The Russian people were not united, the spirit of patriotism was weak, there was an absence of any national ideal by which the people

were united into that solidarity so essential to the prosecution of a war. Manufacturing resources were limited and unorganized, and were concentrated for the most part in Russian Poland, west of the Vistula. Russia could, moreover, be cut off from the seas except at Vladivostok, from which the traffic is limited by a single and very long railroad haul. Thus Russia was chiefly dependent for supplies and munitions on her domestic manufactures, except during the summer weather, when the White Sea ports would be open. In addition to this, Austria, Germany's ally, was cut off completely from participating in an attack on France, her territory stretching squarely across Russia's southern flank in Poland. From this accident of geography, Austria, if Germany could engage Russia's attention on the Poland frontier, could outflank the Russian army at all points along the Galician boundary.

Had Germany struck eastward against Russia, instead of westward against Belgium and France, what would have been the result? In the first place England proposed to Germany that, if she would preserve the neutrality of Belgium and direct no offensive against the northern coast of France, she would remain neutral. There would

also have been a great difference in the attitude of France. France unquestionably would have lived up to her treaty with Russia. But there was a strong pro-German party in France at the time, and this party, if the sacred soil of France had remained untouched, would have been extremely powerful. France with the Germans on her soil is one thing; France with her soil unscarified by the German heel is another. The war in France would not have been popular and the spirit which has meant so much to France and to the Entente would have for the most part been lacking. Russia, in such case, would have received the full force of a blow delivered with the combined strength of Germany and Austria.

We saw, between April and November 1915, what such a condition would bring about. Germany, although holding long lines in the west, turned on Russia, and in this short time all but eliminated her from the war. Had this blow been delivered nine months earlier with the additional men Germany would have had at her command through confining herself to defensive action against France, the entire Russian army could have been destroyed, and the Germans

could have taken the Russian capital. An independent peace would then have followed, and Germany would have been left free to deal with France. When matters had reached this stage France, which entered the war only to fulfill her treaty, also would have made peace, and the war would have been over within six months. Germany's rule in the east would have been unquestioned, the Russian menace would have been completely done away with, and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf right of way secured, for Turkey was already in German grasp.

Why was this not done? Why, if the German dream led only from Hamburg to Bagdad, did Germany strike west when there were such overwhelming advantages in locating the war in the east? Why did Germany deliberately flaunt Great Britain and risk drawing her into the war, when, by turning to the east instead of the west, Great Britain would have remained neutral? Why did Germany ignore the fact that in 1914 France, if not invaded, would have withdrawn from the war if Russia had made peace, since France only entered the war through her treaty with Russia?

To all of these questions we can find but the

one answer. It is that, in beginning the war, Germany looked to a westward expansion as fully equal in importance to an eastward extension of her sphere of influence. She figured that by coming down through Belgium, she could take Calais, and gain control of the Belgian coast from the Franco-Belgian frontier to Holland. She figured that she would flank the fortifications of Verdun which had been constructed to defend against an attack from the east but not from the north, break a gap in the French defensive line at this point, reach Paris, and force on France a peace which would give Germany the French iron mines of Longwy and of Brie. She figured that the possession of the important strategic coastal cities would place her in position to begin a colonial policy, a policy of expansion over the entire world. With her guns pointed at England's throat from Antwerp, Ostend and Calais, she meant to begin the attack on the far flung British Empire.

Master then of three-quarters of all of the iron of Europe, France reduced to a second or third rate power, Germany could then begin a naval development which would eventually wrest from England the title of Mistress of the Seas and

place Germany in control of the world on land and sea. "World Power or Downfall," said Bernhardt in 1912. But how could world power be reached without destroying France, and rendering England impotent? No, the Pan-German dream was not Hamburg to Bagdad, but Calais to Bagdad.

Once France was conquered, Germany considered that it would be very simple to deal with the eastern phase of Pan-Germania. Russia would not last three months. Petrograd was swamped with sedition; every Russian council was filled with German spies; the Russian Premier himself was a German agent; the Russian queen, sister of the Kaiser, was loyal to her brother's interests. Russia was without immediately available iron and coal, without sufficient factories; she had not the equipment with which to wage war. In six months Russia would have become as truly a German vassal as she is now, Serbia would have been eliminated, and the eastern boundary of Germany would have become conterminous with the western boundary of Persia. German domination of both the European and Asiatic continents would now be complete.

The bibliography of Pan-Germania is replete

with allusions to this ambition. Lest, however, the charge be made that quotations from Pan-German writers have been selected prejudicially and without regard to the general context from which they are taken, I have first tried to show the working of the Pan-German scheme in actual operation. We may, however, turn now to this bibliography, to the schemes advanced by the Pan-German writers as a means of proving that this idea of a western expansion is combined, in the German plan, with the extension of Germanic influence into the Near East. Through this channel, we may at the same time trace the rapid development of the Pan-Germanic theory, the demands of which in 1895 were extremely modest as compared with the land hunger as it exists to-day.

“We must create a Central Europe,” said Paul de Lagarde, writing in 1905, “which will guarantee the peace of the entire continent from the moment when it shall have driven the Russians from the Black Sea and the Slavs from the south, and shall have conquered large tracts to the east of our frontiers for German colonization. We cannot let loose, *ex abrupto*, the war which will create this Central Europe. All we can do is to

accustom our people to the thought that this war must come." And at this juncture we might interpolate that the process of driving the Russians from the Black Sea, through the Germanization of the new state of Ukraine, is going on apace, and that the Slavs have already been driven from the south. Therefore this element in the foundation of the Central European Empire has already become a fact.

Writing in the same year, and showing the desires of Pan-Germanists westward, another Pan-German writer, Joseph Ludwig Reimer, has this to say with reference to all of Germany's smaller neighbors:

"Such false ideas as to nationality, speech and race are prevalent . . . that it is often maintained that no breaking up of nations would be necessary, but that a 'Germanization' *in the mass* of the nations in question (Germany's smaller neighbors) would be sufficient."

And the same writer, later on, in his book, "A Pan-German Germany," from which the above extract was taken, makes this definite proposal, which, be it noted, strikes westward at Holland:

"We desire, and must desire . . . a world-empire of Teutonic stock, under the hegemony

of the German people. In order to secure this we must—

- (a) Gradually Germanize the Scandinavian and Dutch Teutonic States, denationalizing them in the weaker significance of the term;
- (b) Break up the predominantly un-Teutonic peoples into their component parts, in order to take to ourselves the Teutonic element and Germanize it, while we reject the un-Teutonic element.”

Professor Ernst Hasse, writing in 1906, carries this idea somewhat further along the course it has since taken:

“The territory open to future German expansion . . . must extend from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Persian Gulf, absorbing the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Switzerland, the whole basin of the Danube, the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor.”

In 1911, to come nearer down to the present day, Maximilian Harden, whose word is particularly valuable in view of the position he has taken on German war aims since 1915, emphasized the German intention to spread toward the Atlantic:

“Since the Western Powers restrict our right to

life, it is necessary that we should attach one of them to us, or that we should sweep them out of our way by force."

Which one was to be attached? Why "sweep them out of our way by force" unless it was to expand westward? Belgium was in Harden's mind; Belgium and probably France as well, since they are the only two powers west of Germany that in any way hindered Germany's growth; Belgium, from the fact that she possessed a sea coast; France, partly for the same reason, and partly because of her economic importance and military strength.

And finally let us quote the official corroboration of the German plan to expand westward, as well as eastward and southeast.

A German socialist deputy obtained and read in the German Reichstag a secret memorandum sent by Chancellor Michaelis to Austria in 1916. This memorandum contained the following passages:

"The motive of all of Germany's acts is the lack of territory, both for the development of commerce and colonization. Germany has to solve two problems—the freedom of the seas and the opening of a route to the southeast. And these two problems

can only be solved through the destruction of England.

"Our object is the permanent securing of the German Empire in Central Europe and the extension of its territory. No one who understands the significance of this war can doubt that, in spite of our wish to be moderate, we shall not allow ourselves to be deterred from extending the borders of the empire and from, under all circumstances, annexing such territories as are fitted for colonization and are not subjected to the influence of the sea power.

"We can weaken her (Russia) materially by taking away her border territories, the Baltic provinces. By using skillful policies the Baltic provinces can easily be Germanized. They will be settled with Germans and their population will double itself. That is the reason why they must be annexed.

. . . The frontier between the German Empire and Poland must be materially altered. . . . The lakes, which we shall not leave in the hands of the Russians at any price, will be included within our borders.

"In the Vosges the boundary line must be improved by the annexation of some valleys, so that the German frontier troops can no longer be fired upon from French territory. France will lose Briey and a strip of land west of Luxemburg. The value of Briey in an economic and military sense is evident from the fact that 16,000,000 tons of iron ore

are produced there. For the safeguarding of the German and Luxemburg iron industry Longwy must remain in our hands."

It is not necessary to continue these quotations further.

The quotations which have been used are sufficient to show that the Pan-German scheme did include the annexing of part at least of France and Belgium and later the destruction of England; and the fact that, contrary to all the logic of the situation, the action of the German Government at the beginning of the war in attacking through France and Belgium was in direct furtherance of the Pan-German plan. It is unnecessary to take up the matter of expansion toward the east. This is not because their intention to expand eastward and establish the Hamburg-Bagdad control is not of equal importance. Indeed in so far as the peace of Europe—present and future—is concerned, it is of even greater importance, since if the eastern object of the Pan-German scheme be frustrated, the entire plan falls to the ground. But as the military situation stands, the eastern phase is practically a *fait accompli*. Serbia has been demolished and the Belgrade-Nish link in the Oriental Railroad is

secured; Bulgaria and Turkey are totally subdued through economic dependence and are in all things subservient to their Teutonic masters; Austria remains, as she has been since the beginning, a German vassal. A part of Palestine and of eastern Mesopotamia as far as Bagdad is, it is true, in British hands; but Russia has failed, the British are alone in their fight, and the activities of their two forces can not decide the war.

But whatever of the German ambition in the Near East remains unachieved through these British forces, it has been more than compensated for by the annexations in Russia. The German gains east of the Prussian frontier have opened a vista far beyond the wildest dreams of the most rabid Pan-Germanist; and what Germany has already acquired will not be released unless Germany is forced, by force of arms, to disgorge.

The situation in the west is essentially different. What Germany holds in France and Belgium falls irreparably short of her ambitions. Moreover, not only is she unable to go farther, but that which she has will certainly be taken away, and, sooner or later, she must eventually fall back

behind her own frontiers. If this were to come about through a peace compromise the result would merely be an armed truce. The German ambition for western expansion would merely sleep to awake later in another, and more terrible war. Therefore I have emphasized the western situation since, because of its relation to the future, it is the most pregnant with danger.

CHAPTER II

GERMANY'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE REVEALED

IN presenting the evidence that Germany's thought is already projecting itself into another war, that preparations are already being not only actively considered but actually made, I shall purposely refrain from selecting data from the German press. This press has, for the past two years, been filled with such references, but the press of any country is not conclusive evidence of that country's intentions or of the purposes of its leaders. We may say that a certain paper is the organ of this or of that party and that its utterances may therefore be considered as having an atmosphere of official sanction. This, however, is open to dispute. The object here is not to delve into the realm of controversial matters but to present only those things which are known to be facts. From such facts, and we cannot dispute facts, we are at liberty to draw conclusions and to act on the

logical consequences of the facts as being the most probable state of affairs with which we have to contend. From official Germany herself, through the medium of prominent German officials who are known and recognized as such over the entire reading world, we have outspoken and frank statements as to just how the German mind is working at this moment.

Lieutenant-General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, Deputy Chief of the German General Staff, ranks officially as the third soldier in the German Empire. He is the most distinguished writer in the German army, and the only officer, since the war began, to be decorated with the *Ordre Pour le Mérite*, Peace Class, which is conferred for distinction in science and arts. A word as to the personal characteristics of this officer will give an idea as to how much weight we may place upon what he has to say. He is distinctly not of the swaggering, swashbuckling, boastful type of German officer so frequently met with, in peace days, in the streets of Berlin and of the other German cities. On the contrary, he is distinctly of the student type, arguing dispassionately, and appreciating with commendatory fairness and sincerity the good qualities

and fighting ability of Germany's present enemies, and of the probable enemies of the future. For the past two or three years he has been regarded as the mouthpiece of the German army, and it may therefore be assumed that what he has to say bears at least the imprint of approval from military Germany.

He has furnished us with a book entitled "Deductions from the World War," in which he discusses broadly and calmly the applications of this war's lessons to the next, and what preparations Germany must make so that the errors of the present conflict may not be repeated when the next war is launched. His book was never intended to reach either neutral countries or Germany's enemies. It was written entirely for German consumption and German benefit. Its circulation was greatly encouraged by the German Government, but because of the writer's candor in avowing Germany's intention to prepare for the next war as soon as circumstances permit, all newspaper criticism was prohibited by the censor and the export of the book absolutely forbidden. A few copies, however, managed to leak through the barriers imposed by the Government and the book has been translated

and published in Great Britain and the United States.

Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven first discusses the general question of peace, of disarmaments, and of arbitration. Incidentally it may be noted he has made reference to Germany's intention to obtain world power, about which so much has been written:

“It may be asked, What is the use of all this? Will not the general exhaustion of Europe, after the world conflagration, of a certainty put the danger of a new war, to begin with, in the background, and does not this terrible slaughter of nations point inevitably to the necessity of disarmaments to pave the way to permanent peace? The reply to that is that nobody can undertake to guarantee a long period of peace and that a lasting peace is guaranteed only by strong armaments. Our own armament, although it may have been defective in some respects, has none the less secured peace for us for forty years, that is to say, for such a length of time as has hardly ever before been experienced in the world's history in the case of a great country.”

Here not only is cleverly and plausibly laid down an excuse to the German people for the

remarkable state of military preparedness and for their huge ante-war expenditures, but with equal cleverness, the mind is prepared for a continuation of this condition after the present war is over. But to continue the quotation.

“Moreover, world power is inconceivable without striving for expression of power in the world, and consequently for sea power. But this involves the constant existence of a large number of potential causes of friction. Hence arises the necessity for adequate armaments on land and sea. . . . A long peace, such as that which preceded the World War, had frequently caused us to overlook the fact that it was not the fine phrases about international bliss and brotherhood, uttered on every occasion at public meetings, which preserved us from war, but the might of our sword, which was only fully revealed on the outbreak of hostilities. And it will only be by this might that we shall be able to safeguard peace in the future.”

If we had the slightest reason to believe in Germany's good faith; if we did not know that she is unscrupulous, deceitful, without any conceptions of national honor as that term is understood by the civilized people of the world; if

Germany's history did not prove that she cannot have power without abusing it, we might interpret the latter part of the last quotation as a reasonable step for the preservation of the nation. But it is Germany's abuse of power that we have learned to fear; not her use of it. And with our knowledge of what Germany would do with military power in the future, should we be safe in permitting her to end the war with her military strength unimpaired, relatively stronger indeed than it was in 1914? In the same paragraph in which General von Freytag-Loringhoven demands a strong military body as a defensive measure, has he not expressly stated Germany's desire for world power?

Later in his book he gives us again new cause for fear; insinuating, in terms so plain that it is impossible to mistake his meaning, just what the German attitude will be toward future treaties, which, in the mind of the military leaders, prevent German expansion. In the same extract we also learn something about the German opinion of a league of nations, banded together in the interests of peace:

"We misconstrue reality, if we imagine that it is possible to rid the world of war by means of

mutual agreements. Such agreements will, in the future as in the past, be concluded from time to time between states. The further development of international courts of arbitration and the elimination of many causes of dispute by their agency lie within the realms of possibility, but any such agreements will after all only be treaties which will not on every occasion be capable of holding in check forces seething within the states. . . . In any event, as regards us Germans, the World War should disencumber us once and for all of any vague cosmopolitan sentimentality. If our enemies, both our secret and our avowed enemies, make professions of this nature, that is for us sufficient evidence of the hypocrisy which underlies them."

In taking up the present war and discussing German failures and mistakes he dwells at some length on the Battle of the Marne, Germany's first admission that there was such a battle or that a defeat was suffered in the first mad rush forward in 1914.

The next war must be so planned, he informs us, that Germany may keep on the offensive and that there shall be no subsidence into trench warfare; a war of movement shall be maintained

from the outset. The Germans failed at the Marne because they were not strong enough to break down France, and this mistake must not occur in the next war, he tells us.

“If at that time no decisive victory fell to our share, and our strength proved insufficient to vanquish France, we must none the less consider that up to the Marne we had achieved enormous things. ‘In the very moment of accomplishment,’” he says, quoting a Swiss military critic, “‘the completion of the battle was abandoned for far-reaching general reasons. . . . The battle was broken off by the German Supreme Command, and in view of the general situation, a strategic retreat to a new line was ordered.’ This is the judgment of a neutral writer on the battle of the Marne, and certainly it would have taken very little to turn the scale so that victory might have fallen to us and a retreat been avoided. The withdrawal of the German armies after the dazzling successes which had been achieved at the beginning could not but in the nature of things cause bitter disappointment at home.”

He then lays down the guiding principles which shall actuate the German preparations for the next conflict:

"Our business therefore is to maintain the fundamental ideas of war as they lived in the German army up to the year 1914, to soak them in the experiences of the present war, and to make the fullest technical use of these experiences; but to do all this without giving an entirely new direction to our thinking on strategy and tactics."

"We shall have to consider how, in future, to preserve for war the character of the war of movement, all the more so, since in the World War it has only been by the war of movement that we have reaped decisive results. It will, of course, be accompanied by many of the features of intrenched warfare, and, in consequence of the necessity of bringing up and setting in operation the numerous present-day methods of attack, it will be slow."

"The spirit of the offensive which is peculiar to our army we must study to preserve by every means in our power. It has achieved striking results in this war, and has recently once again proved its effectiveness in the summer of 1917 in Eastern Galicia and in the defensive battles in Northern France and Flanders."

He seems to feel that there is a possibility of the

army being democratized, which from his point of view would be a German calamity. He therefore makes use of the following quotation from Prince Buelow to prove his assertion:

“The spirit of German militarism, as Prussia first developed it and Germany adopted it, is every whit as monarchical as it is aristocratic and democratic, and it would cease to be German, and the mighty expression of German imperial military power and military efficiency, were it to change. If our enemies, to whom with God’s help our militarism will bring defeat, abuse it, we know that we must preserve it, for to us it means victory and the future of Germany.”

As to general conclusions, the following quotations will suffice.

“The war has, on the one hand, revealed to us the full financial strength of Germany; but, on the other hand, it has proved that additional expenditure on the army at the right time would have been profitable. We should then have saved in this war not only millions of marks, but in all probability we should have had to offer up a far less considerable sacrifice of men. In view of the central position of the Fatherland, larger expenditure on the land-army, in addition to

the necessary expenditures on the fleet, was absolutely essential.

"The demands which in this connection were put before the Reichstag were but a feeble minimum of what was really desirable, as the World War has proved. . . . We have to learn from it the lesson that in future we must disregard every objection, and must see to it that the disproportion between the credits which are asked for and what has to be done in case of war shall in any case never again be so great as it was in the World War.

"In the future, as in the past, the German people will have to seek firm cohesion in its glorious army and in its belauled young fleet."

I have dilated to such an extent on this volume because the deliberation, the freedom from chauvinistic tendencies, and the fairness of its reasoning make it peculiarly impressive reading. The object of the volume is very plain. It is free from the slightest attempt to dissemble or to avoid the issue. It is simply to point out the errors which the present war has revealed, and to show how, in the preparations which are now under way for the next war, the mistakes of the present may be avoided.

We shall return later, in discussing Belgium, to the current military thought of Germany, but for the present we may dispense with it and see what civilian Germany thinks of these war preparations.

In December 1917 the Association of German Manufacturers of Iron and Steel and the Association of German Metallurgists, with headquarters at Berlin and Düsseldorf, drew up a memorial which was addressed to the German Government and to the German High Military Command, demanding that Germany annex the French iron areas centering in Longwy and Briey because of their "extreme importance for German national economy and for the conduct of future wars." A copy of this memorial, which is in the hands of the French authorities, furnishes most positive evidence that the large commercial organizations of Germany are in exactly the same frame of mind as is the military element. The importance of the iron of Lorraine and of the Briey basin has of course been widely recognized. This indeed was the dominating element which inspired in Germany her desire for a western expansion which was discussed

in the first part of this volume. This subject is gone into with elaborate care as is also the relation of both French and German Lorraine to the present war. "If, with the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the French had destroyed their own iron mines of the Briey and Longwy basins, which later fell into the hands of the Germans, and at the same time with their long-range guns destroyed the iron mines on the German side of the Lorraine frontier, the war could not have lasted more than a few months."

Continuing, this memorial demands that the frontier be pushed westward not only to include the present French iron deposits, but to place them beyond the range of the French artillery. Only in this way, it states, can France be prevented from checking Germany's future wars.


Further, the memorial points out that the life of Germany's own deposits is not more than fifty years and concludes as a consequence:

"Let no one believe that Germany in peace time will be able to assure herself iron reserves for a future war. And let no one dare to pretend

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on his own responsibility that such iron reserves would be sufficient.

“During the first forty months of this war



MINES THAT ARE THE TEST OF VICTORY

The loss of the iron mines of Lorraine would mean, to Germany, the loss of more than half of her total supply of iron ore, upon which, in turn, depends the all-essential supply of guns, shells, and rails for the German Army. With these mines in Allied hands, therefore, Germany could not long continue to prosecute the war

Germany, in order to meet the needs of her national defense, spent over 50,000,000 tons of iron and steel.

“We do not have the right to count that in a future war we will have the good fortune

a second time to be able to exploit the territories occupied and to increase our resources of first materials."

Taking up the use of steel in the next war, and following in a general way the idea emphasized so strongly by General von Freytag-Loringhoven, the memorial states:

"For the future war it is necessary that we dispose of considerable resources in German ore, for the richer an industrial nation is in iron ore the greater it is feared by its enemies.

"In the future it will not be masses of men grouped in gigantic armies that will decide the war, but above all defensive and offensive instruments of perfected technic placed at the disposition of the combatants in sufficient quantities and constantly renewed.

LORRAINE AS A PROTECTION

"It is thus that the mineral districts of Lorraine, to which we are already indebted for not having been annihilated in the present war, will protect us in the future war and permit us to assure the welfare of the empire and at the same time spare the blood of the people.

"It is necessary to see in the seizure by

Germany of all of Lorraine not merely a war indemnity and a source of vigor for the fatherland, but also a guarantee of a durable peace and of security for the fatherland."

We thus have from the highest military source and from a civilian source equally high, frequent and emphatic references to what is in the German mind at this moment—and all corroborated by Chancellor Michaelis's memorandum to Austria. If we wish to turn to the political factors and ascertain whether the politicians now in charge are in accord with the views expressed by these elements in the empire, it is but necessary to read Hertling's address before the Reichstag in February, answering President Wilson's peace principles. Hertling makes no mention, of course, of Germany's plans, yet at the same time his speech bristles with references to another war in which Germany must defend herself, and must therefore, as a means for defense, remain in possession of this or that part of Belgium. It is all indicative of a frame of mind, a mind which for years has been brought up on war and trained to think in terms of war. And all the German mind conceives to-day is a peace

which will enable the state to wage most effectively the next war in which it is engaged. Nothing is further from German purpose or German desire than to make a peace which will stabilize Europe, and lessen to a minimum the chances of future conflict.

CHAPTER III

DESPOLIATION OF BELGIUM SYSTEMATIC AND NOT WANTON

GERMAN ambitions and the German plan to achieve them have been made clear in many ways, once the nucleus of the idea becomes established. German writers—commercial, military and political—have been kind enough to furnish us with the premises from which to reason. They have established for us the fact that the idea of another war is in the air, and that, in so far as the ruling classes—politically and financially—are concerned, it is a fixed idea.

The question that now arises is: Has anything yet been done to translate this idea into facts, or has it died aborning, so to speak? In other words: Is there anything in what Germany has actually done since the war began that can be reasonably interpreted as bearing out the idea of preparation for another great war?

In this connection the sequence of events in both Belgium and France since 1914 is an interesting study. The first phase of the invasion of Belgium might be termed the period of atrocities. The crimes of the German army, crimes which were sanctioned by the highest German authorities and willingly committed by the German soldiery, are generally known and have been amply testified to by many American authorities of unimpeachable veracity. There can be no doubt in the mind of any man, whose mind functions otherwise than in a strictly German fashion, that such crimes were committed. The horrors of the ravishing of Dinant, of Termonde, of Louvain, are indeed well established and, to some extent at least, will always remain fresh in our mind. These crimes held a very specific object quite in keeping with German military policy. This object was to so instill in the soul of the Belgian fear and terror of Germany and of all things German, that there should be no uprising, either in mass or on the part of individuals, against the invaders. It is only fair to acknowledge, however, that the atrocities which were committed were limited in area to the line of

advance of the army. Arson, rape, and plunder were the rule in this pathway, but outside of it little destruction was carried on.

After the first battle of Ypres, however, when the war had settled down into trenches and the battle line had been established from Nieuport southward, German tactics changed. Then the German occupation was an established fact; there was small danger that, at least for some time to come, it would be interfered with. The German problem in Belgium ceased to be primarily military and became essentially one of administration—although an administration solely for German purposes and to serve German ends.

The problem having changed, the methods also changed. The atrocities ceased; and, except in isolated cases such as the murder of Edith Cavell and the assassination of Capt. Fryatt, were heard of no longer. Germany, on the contrary, set about to reconstitute the Belgian industries which, naturally, had suspended operations, and to restore, in so far as it was possible, the ante-bellum commercial processes. It is true that the production of the factories was taken over by German authorities

when it served their ends to do so; it is true that the agriculture of Belgium was converted to fill a German need; galling restrictions were placed upon the free movement of the people and the most rigid discipline was enforced. But nevertheless, the German rule was, according to German lights, decent, and generally calculated to promote the welfare of the country if not of its citizens. Except for the exaction of outrageous and—if we may still refer to international law—illegal money indemnities and the sequestration of personal property without reimbursement, Germany made but little effort to interfere with the commercial processes of the conquered state. The general attitude was one which they intended to be one of encouragement.

This was the second phase—the period of semi-peaceful occupation. But this, too, was all changed later and there was ushered in a third phase, a period marked by as systematic despoliation of all of Belgium's industry, the destruction of its commercial structure, the social annihilation of its population. These were brought about by events in the military theater.

Until June 1916 German military leaders retained their belief in ultimate German victory on all fronts. Russia they considered was out of the war—if not permanently, at least for so long that her revivification would be valueless to the Entente. Germany was free therefore, in the opinion of her leaders, to concentrate on the western front and to pound her way through to victory. In such event, Belgium of course would never be restored to existence as a separate entity, but if it existed at all would either have life only as a German vassal or be loosened from the German grip, minus its coast line, its strategic frontier on the Meuse and the Sambre. The Pan-German party indeed—decrying the 1914 statement of Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, that the invasion was a crime against international law for which compensation must be given after the war—was clamoring for the annexation of the entire occupied portion of the state.

The German view of the Belgian situation was, then, that the state would be freed, stripped of its coal, its iron, and its sea coast. This being the German belief, there was no

reason why it should be despoiled by Germany and every reason why it should be preserved.

But in June 1916 Germany received a terrific shock. Russia had come back to her own. The German victory of the year before had not been as complete or as devastating as the Germans had calculated upon. Brusiloff's great offensive had torn great gaps in the Austrian lines, laid bare the flanks, and threatened to tear loose the German grip on Courland and Poland, and throw all Teutonic armies back behind the Bug or the Vistula. Although in the midst of the great battle of Verdun, Germany had to fill in these gaps in the Austrian line to save the situation. But hardly had she made the first move when she was startled by the booming of the artillery fire which opened the battle of the Somme on the 1st of July. Although checked at Verdun, Germany still had faith in her ultimate success. She still believed in the indestructible integrity of her western lines.

She was soon to be undeceived. The battle of the Somme was hardly a month old, when the Allied artillery had pounded into the German consciousness that, after all, there was to

be no German victory in the west. On the contrary, so completely were their mental processes inverted as a result of the steady creep forward of the French and British lines, that the controlling thought was not of victory but of how to avert defeat. For the first time Germany realized that no peace was probable which did not provide for an independent, reconstituted and indemnified Belgium.

The German tactics in Belgium were immediately changed. Then began the process of complete economic and social destruction. The first concrete evidence of Germany's intentions took the form of the deportation of the men of Belgium into Germany—the enslaving of the male population. Germany, of course, wove the usual network of lies in extenuation of this, the grossest crime of the war, just as soon as the protests from all civilized humanity began to pour in; her claim being that only the idle were deported. This was in a sense true, but why were there so many idlers, how did they become idle?

Baron Adolph von Bachofen, a German official who visited the occupied territory in the very early summer of 1916, wrote most

enthusiastically of the work of the German Civil administration in reviving industrial and agricultural activity. As to agriculture, he stated then that "the supply of live stock is now again at its former height and the agricultural output is scarcely less than at any time before the conquest."

Consequently, previous to October 3, 1916, the date of the first deportation order, there could have been no idleness among the agricultural workers. In fact, because of the absence in the army of so many of those who normally worked on the farms, heavy drafts must have been made on factory workers in order to keep up the agricultural output to what it was "before the conquest." Consequently, the number of factory workers who might have been idle was necessarily reduced. But, if we may accept the word of this German official investigator, over 70 per cent. of the coal mines were in operation and the percentage was constantly increasing; practically all of the iron mines and steel works; the pottery workers; even the diamond cutters—all these, together with most of the other industries, were approaching normal. There

could have been no great increase in the number of unemployed over that which had existed during the preceding two years. Moreover, we have the evidence I have just quoted that this number, due to the wisdom of German administration, was steadily decreasing. Therefore if there was an abnormal number of idle Belgian men, it must have been because the Germans themselves deliberately created such a condition.

As a matter of fact this is exactly what happened. The German commanders stripped the Belgian factories of all machinery, threw out of employment all of the workers, and then under plea of idleness deported them. This is well known to any of the Americans who served with and under Herbert Hoover on the Belgian Relief Commission, to Brand Whitlock, the American Ambassador, to any of a hundred other Americans of established reputation.

We can see then why the Germans picked, as the scenes for the first raids, Courtrai, Alost, Termonde, Bruges, Ghent, and Mons, as was claimed in the Belgian Government's protest to neutral powers against the forcible deporta-

tion of civilians. Courtrai, Bruges, and Ghent were, before the war, the centers of the textile industry. Bruges also contained woolen mills and lace factories; Ghent, many lead and shot factories, gold and silver workers. Mons was one of the centers of metal working. Thus there is seen to be a close relation between Belgian industry and the points selected from which to steal and deport Belgian men.

Now let us see what happened to this industry as admitted by Germany and as charged by the Belgian Government. The note from the latter on this subject cites the following passages from a semi-official note that appeared in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 392, of December 18, 1917, in which we find an admission of the truth of the statements made in regard to dismantling the German factories.

"All measures taken in Belgium are inspired by military necessity.

"The exploitation, under military control, of Belgian factories in order to repair locomotives and automobiles, and also to obtain material of war for the front, is carried out for the purpose of relieving the strain on German industry and economizing transportation. It has become necessary to strip the Belgian factories of their machinery

and other fittings, because all German industry is busy filling orders for material of war. . . . By relieving the home market from the necessity of enlarging our own factories we are accelerating the production of munitions and other products. . . . In consequence of the intense activity of all German industry, our machinery and other equipment is tremendously overworked, and must from time to time be partly replaced by new machines, while, furthermore, we must be able to furnish spare parts rapidly unless we wish to see our output of munitions diminish. The machinery and equipment required for these purposes are evidently brought from Belgian factories. The destruction of whole factories for the production of grapeshot is effected in order to maintain at its present level the supply of iron and steel in Germany or, if possible, to raise it. . . . It is not only possible, but even evident, that, in view of all the steps taken by the military authorities, the question of keeping up work in some of the factories of the occupied country must be subordinated to considerations tending to spare the lives of German soldiers and thus protect our national power."

In latter days, Germany did not go through the formality of stripping the factories first and then of deporting the men thus thrown idle. In many cases she has deported the men first, as a means of destroying the Belgian

commercial system, and then, as the factories were idle, Belgium of course had no use for them, so they were either stripped or turned over to German interests.

On this general subject, there was received in the United States in the middle of February 1918, an official Belgian document from which the following extracts are taken.

First we see the working of the usual German method—a plea first in denial, then of justification and excuse. The Belgian note first quotes from the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* of December 27, 1917, the following telegram, dated Berlin, the same day:

“Reuter is sending out the assertion that the Germans are pillaging and demolishing the Belgian factories in order to hamper Belgian commerce after the war. On the contrary, Germany has already, merely in her own interest, done everything she could to restore to life the paralyzed industry of Belgium. If she has only partly succeeded, the blame rests entirely on England, which has obstinately opposed every arrangement to supply the Belgian factories with raw material.”

To read such a statement in connection with that from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*

of December 18th, issued only ten days before, and which I have previously quoted, not only fills one with contempt but with a feeling of pity for a nation which has sunk so low that it must defend its every act with a fabrication of lies which are so numerous and so frequent that they do not possess even the merit of consistency.

To this statement the Belgian Government has issued a reply the essence of which is true and which the Americans, whose names I have mentioned and who have had every means of ascertaining the truth on the ground, have already publicly stated to be the facts.

“Germany is trying in vain to throw upon others the responsibility for the ruin of Belgian industry. She is condemned by the facts and by her own admissions.

“Germany is the immediate author of the cessation of industry in Belgium. In 1914 and 1915 she seized all the existing stock of raw material.

“It is strictly her fault that the importation of raw material could not be arranged for. In August and September 1915 there was submitted to the British Government, and accepted by it, a plan for organizing the supply of raw material to the industries of Belgium, under international guar-

antees analogous to those which protect the supply of food. To save the industries of Belgium it remained only to obtain Germany's consent. But she turned a deaf ear, and the project naturally had no result. The British Government, in a letter published through the newspapers, officially declared Germany responsible."

The Belgian report then goes on to relate the various steps Germany has taken to cripple Belgian industries.

"The German authorities then aggravated the evils of industrial stoppage by forbidding public works and commandeering the factories and metals and leather for military purposes. After this they instituted the barbarous system of deporting workmen to perform forced labor in Germany, a system which they had to interrupt officially, after some months, because it proved revolting to the conscience of mankind, but only to substitute for it immediately the forced labor of the civilian population, in work of military value, by order of the military authorities. This system is still being cruelly maintained in the zones lying back of the fighting line in the provinces of East and West Flanders, Hainaut, Namur, and Luxemburg.

"Meanwhile, the commandeering has become general, and affects both natural and manufactured products and also tools, motors, and means of transportation, whether mechanical or animal.

Finally, fiscal and administrative measures have been taken to close the last remaining outlets for Belgian products into neutral countries.

"These facts are incontestable. They are proved by many rules and regulations officially published by the German authorities."

Referring specifically to the stripping of the Belgian factories of machinery, and the transportation of this machinery into Germany, this official note states:

"At present the raid upon the last economic resources of occupied Belgium has been carried on to such an extent that they are methodically taking away all the machinery from the factories, which they themselves have made idle, in some cases to set it up again in Germany, in other cases to break it up and use it for grapeshot.

"The purpose of this entire system of destruction is double: First, to supply deficiencies in German industry; second, to put an end to Belgian competition and later to subject Belgian industry to that of German when the time comes for refitting the factories with machinery after the war.

"The proofs collected by the Belgian Government in support of this statement are conclusive.

"It is significant that in general the task of systematically stripping Belgian factories was entrusted to German manufacturers, who were the

direct competitors of the Belgian owners. Some of them have taken advantage of their official positions to steal secrets of manufacturing processes—for example, at the artificial silk shops of Obourg—and personal methods of production and sale.

“Moreover, some of these authorized pillagers have let fall admissions, which have been reproduced in the German press and which leave no room for doubt. These admissions are strung along throughout the years 1915 to 1917; they agree with one another, and have become more and more precise as the war has gone on.”

This question of the destruction of Belgian industries, particularly since the early fall of 1916, has been dealt with at considerable length because it is one of the most important elements of the German scheme. It emphasizes the transition from the second to the third phase of the Belgian occupation, and the change of the German attitude toward Belgium incident to that transition. As long as Germany thought that she was to remain in possession of Belgium, her policy was generally constructive; when, however, she realized that her scheme was to be frustrated, she deliberately set out to obliterate Belgium from Europe.

The net results which have been accomplished through this process are:

First: the impoverishing of the country through outrageous levies of money.

Second: the economic ruin brought about through stripping all factories of their machinery.

Third: the social and commercial destruction produced through the deportation of the able-bodied male element in the population.

In brief, Belgium is but a shell. Its factories are but walls; its population composed for the most part only of women, children, and old men; its past commercial structure in ruins. Economic dependence is absolute and it is the German intention that it remain so.

Before linking up this outline of the German processes in Belgium with the German plan for a future war, we may first examine the situation in northeastern France and compare the German actions here with those in Belgium. In the early days of the German invasion of France there was an apparent regard for the laws of war, and no organized destruction. Indeed, for the short period during which the Germans occupied Rheims, they paid the

French in gold, and at a very good price, for all the wine they drank.

But this period was short. Once the battle lines became established, occupied France was



THE DESTRUCTION OF BELGIUM

The areas in which the Germans have destroyed cities and towns in this thickly populated industrial country. Everywhere they have stripped industry of its machinery and deported labor in an effort to keep Belgium from becoming an economic competitor after the war. The size of the dots on the map indicates the number of buildings destroyed. The largest (Ypres), 3700 buildings destroyed; the smallest (Poulseur), 25 (or less) buildings destroyed

governed very much as was Belgium in the second phase of occupation. But again the battle of the Somme intervened and Germany learned that she was not to be permitted to

hold in the west any of the gains she had so foully acquired. Threatened, as a result of the Somme fighting, with serious disaster, she prepared for retreat to a new line.

The wave of horror which swept over the world when the nature of this retreat became known, will keep its memory alive at least until those who read of it have gone. The whole countryside was literally leveled to the ground. Orchards were destroyed, every tree sawed off close to the roots, every farmhouse with its outbuildings burned, every garden and every bush uprooted. Every work of art and of architecture was leveled, all Nature was systematically ravished until all that remained of a populous thriving country were the earth and the sky.

The tearing up of earth roads, the dynamiting of bridges and railroads, these are all calculated to delay an advancing army and, consequently, are reasonable, if regrettable, precautions for an army in retreat to take. But for that orgy of rapacious, vicious devastation there seemed no logical reason or excuse. The popular idea at the time was that all this was but the outcropping of the same spirit

that manifested itself in Belgium; that it was but evidence of an innate lust for destruction, of a pure vandalistic tendency.

This might hold true were the acts but the acts of individuals. But they were not. The whole idea was carried out in the prosecution of a carefully considered, thoroughly organized, plan. It was dictated neither by an instinct for destruction nor through impulse. Germany does not work that way. She is cunning, shrewdly calculating, materialistic. Her leaders could not but realize that these acts of rapacity—more like the venting of rage of some savage beast than like the acts of a civilized, organized, state—were calculated to arouse among her enemies a feeling of bitter resentment and hatred that would completely close the door to a generous peace in case of a defeat; and defeat, be it noted, actually threatened. To assume that such deeds were done wantonly, without thought and without motive, is to charge Germany with a thoughtlessness, a carelessness, entirely at variance with our knowledge of her character. There must therefore have been a clearly defined and well understood motive.

Since, as has been proven, Germany has for generations been casting a covetous eye westward and has expressed the desire if not the intention ultimately to annex the most important territory of her western neighbors, let us assume that she, realizing that in this war she was doomed to defeat in the west, had in mind the launching of another war later, in order to realize the ambitions still ungratified in this quarter. With this assumption as a basis, then, let us see how it fits in with the situation which Germany has created in France and Belgium.

Germany, at the beginning of such a war, will be confronted with the same military problem which confronted her in 1914. From Luxemburg to the Swiss frontier she will be faced first with the fortified area of Verdun, guarded from an eastern attack by the Heights of the Woivre; by the barrier of the Moselle with Nancy as the defensive center, and finally with the Vosges Mountains, passage of which can be forced only through the gaps at Epinal and Belfort, the western exits of which are thoroughly guarded. It is an easy line to defend, a most difficult one to attack.

Would Germany strike here, submitting to

an indefinite delay, or would she come down from the northeast, ignoring again the neutrality of Belgium in order to strike France along an unprotected frontier? With the accumulated knowledge of the last three years, an answer is superfluous. Having flaunted the opinion of the civilized world in 1914 we may be certain she would do the same thing again should it serve her interests. No thinking man, then, will take issue with the assertion that, should Germany strike again at France, her army will advance along the line of least resistance, no matter what violations of neutral territory may be involved in the process.

Striking down through Belgium, what opposition would she meet between the German frontier and Paris? It has been shown how thoroughly Belgium has been destroyed. It was the German plan to have it done so as to defy any immediate reconstruction. Every district, every factory in that district, with its machinery equipment, must be built up anew. Moreover, Belgium would not have the man power to hold in check even a fragment of the German army. With northeastern France, the situation would be the same. Of

all this great industrial region, there would not remain a vestige nor an obstacle. All would be leveled, coal and iron mines destroyed, farms ruined, commercial structures blasted. It would take France indeed just as long to recover as it will Belgium. In much less time would Germany be ready, and with Belgium no longer a thorn in her side, and with the northeastern gateway to France wide open, the German hordes could march, without effective opposition, to Paris and Calais.

It is a repetition of an old German idea. Julius Cæsar wrote of the German tribes as follows:

“The tribes deem it an honorable distinction to have their frontiers devastated, to be surrounded with immense deserts. They regard it as the highest proof of valor for their neighbors to abandon their territories out of fear of them; moreover, they have thus an additional security against sudden attack.”

CHAPTER IV

CALAIS-BAGDAD NOT HAMBURG-BAGDAD

THE GERMAN AIM

WHEN General Moritz von Bissing died he left among his papers an extraordinary document which bears out most positively the conclusions reached in the previous chapter. General von Bissing was the Governor-General of conquered Belgium from 1915 to 1917, so that this document has a peculiar interest in connection with Germany's future plans.

After discussing the present war in a general way, he states:

"I shall now indicate the strategic importance of Belgium for a future war. In order to be able to conduct the present war offensively at all, the German Supreme Command was forced to march through Belgium, and in this process the right wing of the German army had to push itself laboriously along the edge of the Dutch province of Limburg. Strategically, the objective of the present war, as regards the western theater, should consist in our

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obtaining elbow room, in order that in any new war whatever we should be able to operate with our army against France and England. If the result of the present war were the continued existence of an independent Belgian State, the operations would have to be conducted differently and under greater difficulties than at the beginning of the present war; for the aim of France and England will be, in conjunction with an allied or strongly influenced Belgium, to anticipate the German army. It will, therefore, rightly be asked whether in such circumstances it can be possible to guarantee the freedom of operations of the German right wing, and whether the advance of these groups of armies to conduct a new war offensively is possible."

There is in this quotation first a direct reference to another war, showing the trend of German thought even in the midst of the present horrors. A little later he indicates that this projected war is to be against England and France, proving that there is at least the fear that in the present war these nations cannot be worsted. Finally, there is the strategic relation of Belgium to this future war which makes it necessary for the success of German arms that Belgium be removed as a possible enemy by the simple process of annexation.

Somewhat later he discusses the value of industrial Belgium to Germany, and, it will be noted, candidly admits the removal of Belgian machinery to Germany.

"The advantages which we have been able during the present war to obtain from Belgian industry by the removal of machinery and so on, are as important as the disadvantages which our enemies have suffered through lack of this addition to their fighting strength.

"When one considers the importance of Belgium as the theater of our armies' advance and as territory which favors our further operations, both offensively and defensively, there can be no further doubt that a frontier which is quite falsely described as the line of the Meuse and is to be protected by the fortresses of Liège and Namur, is inadequate. No, our frontier—in the interest also of our sea power—must be pushed forward to the sea.

. . . The annual Belgian production of 23,000,000 tons of coal has given us a monopoly on the continent which has helped to maintain our vitality. In addition to these factors which are of importance in a new war, the protection of our economic interests in Belgium, even in time of peace, is of inestimable importance."

This statement is remarkable for the complete lack of moral sense exhibited. There is not

a thought given to any rights that Belgium may have; it is the doctrine of the righteousness of brute force. Anything which will add to German strength, Germany is free to take, no matter to whom it may happen to belong.

As regards the extension of German colonial possessions, we find a most ambitious program.

“The Belgian Congo is certainly to be aimed at, and I desire to insist that a German colonial empire, whatever its shape, is indispensable for Germany’s world policy and expansion of power.”

It is not known exactly when this “political testament” was penned, but it was either in the latter part of 1915 or in the early months of 1916, before the Russian offensive in June or the battle of the Somme in July. In fact this document contains a reference to “a peace concluded in 1916” showing that this is the case. Therefore, while Von Bissing realized the possibility of defeat, the possibility was so remote that he did not give it serious thought. The entire document emphasizes the importance of Belgium to Germany as a ground on which to prepare for another crushing blow at England and France. Had Von Bissing,

holding the views that have been quoted, written six months later, would he not have advocated just such a policy as that which has been carried out in both Belgium and France, so that in the next war they may be able to interpose no obstacles between the German army and the French coast? Would he not, in defeat, have prepared the way for a subsequent victory?

Several objections may be raised to the theory that Germany is thinking of another war. The first is that of money. In the first place, money is not essential to war. As long as a nation is self-supporting and is not compelled to go out into neutral markets for raw materials, foreign credit is not necessary. All that is needed, as Germany has proven, is a printing press and the power to assert that the products of that press shall be the medium of exchange and a hope of victory. If victory is achieved, its fruits will solve the question of foreign credit.

But aside from her credit in foreign countries Germany is wealthier to-day by billions than she was when the war began. She has robbed and looted and pillaged wherever she has set

foot; through Belgian and French coal and iron she has waged war at not more than 50 per cent. of the cost to the Allies who must transport their supply of these essentials three thousand miles overseas; she has annexed thousands of square miles of new and productive territory and is rapidly exploiting it with enslaved labor to which she pays practically nothing in wages. If allowed to hold her Eastern accessions, she could give up all of France and Belgium, pay them both substantial indemnities, and still find the war the most profitable enterprise of that sort she has ever provoked.

But Germany has also been making money in other ways—profiteering at the expense of her Allies. Neither Austria, Bulgaria, nor Turkey contains coal or iron in any material quantities—certainly not in sufficient quantities to supply the demand. While it is true that none of the three has been forced to use artillery on a scale even approximating that of Germany, Austria has still had to supply a great demand on account of the battles against Russia and Italy; Bulgaria because of the fighting first against Serbia and now on the

Saloniki front, Turkey because of the fighting in Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. Practically all of the raw material consumed in these areas was purchased from Germany, and, we may depend upon it, at an exorbitant price; and where did Germany get it?

Germany stole it—coal and iron from Belgium, coal and iron from France, iron from Longwy and Briey, coal from Lens. The mining was done by forced labor from Belgium and France, prisoners from Russia. The cost to Germany was practically nothing. How many hundreds of millions were obtained in this manner only Germany knows—more, certainly, than could be paid for except through loans—through bonds. Germany, therefore, has an economic grip on her allies which only defeat can break—a grip which has throttled them into abject bondage.

Germany too, it must be remembered, has not yet been touched by the war. Only in East Prussia, which is almost entirely agricultural, has the war reached German soil. Westphalia, Rhineland, Saar, the great industrial districts of western Germany, are more keenly alive commercially than in 1914. With her own

wealth but slightly dissipated and with this dissipation more than counterbalanced by increased assets obtained through conquest, with her industries all working at the very top of their stride, Germany's recovery will be most rapid. Certainly, unless some measures are taken to prevent it, she can be ready again for war very rapidly.

A final objection to this idea of a future war rests on the question of man power. Germany has lost heavily in men; will continue to lose heavily during the rest of the war. Her loss in killed alone will, before the day of peace, fall but little short of two million men. For such a war as Germany is planning, her military force must possess overwhelming numbers in order to carry the plan through in permissible time. Where will Germany, who has suffered so heavily in loss of man power, obtain sufficient men to insure victory in the new battle of Europe?

This question, too, Germany has carefully considered. Indeed it was the most pressing element which led to the subjection by Germany of her allies to the degree of vassalage they are now suffering from. Germany wanted

control of their man power as well as of their resources and their trade routes. She cannot be refused now that she holds in her hands their economic fate. The relation of Turkey to Germany is notorious. The Turks are a conquered people—conquered in soul and in body by the tyranny of the Kaiser. They have no independence of plan or of thought. They are slaves. In Turkey there is a population of about twenty million—undisciplined, unorganized, unequipped—but innately possessed of good fighting ability. From this force Germany can, in one generation, produce a trained, organized army of at least two million men. To this number Bulgaria will add half a million more, bringing the number of German-trained soldiers East of Serbia to two and a half million.

But these forces must be brought into play west of Belgrade, and to effect this Germany must control the Oriental Railroad. This will explain Germany's actions in Serbia. Serbia is the bridge which spans the gap between Germany and her Near Eastern allies. Through Serbia and Serbia alone can the German dream of a Hamburg-Bagdad railroad become a reality. If peace were declared and

there were decreed a reconstruction of the Serbian state, there would always exist a constant threat against that all-important link between Belgrade and Nish. Germany can reap the maximum benefits from the Oriental Railroad only through holding in a tutelage which approaches bondage all of the lands through which that railroad passes. Only by this means can Germany develop the full resources of the Near East, organize the Turkish population into an effective military force, and mobilize it in Europe for a war against England and France.

Since Germany cannot unite the Serbs to herself by treaty, and since it was necessary to get Serbia out of the way, Germany deliberately planned to reduce her to a state of complete innocuousness from which she could not recover in a half century, if ever. We therefore witnessed in the fall and winter of 1915, the complete immolation of Serbia on the altar of German ambition. Of the four and a half million of people, about one and a half are dead, one million are in exile or in the army, the others deported into Austria and Bulgaria and undergoing a system of unscrupulous

pulous annihilation. The country itself has been turned into a desert waste; women have been deliberately left to starve and freeze in



GEOGRAPHY OF SERBIAN EXILE

The distances that Serbian exiles are sent preclude the possibility of their easy return after the war

the mountains with their babies on their breasts. Children on whose small shoulders rests the future strength of the state, have been viciously, deliberately murdered. Not one generation must pass but probably two, before Serbia can rise from the ashes; but by that

time, in the German plan, it will be too late; the Oriental road will have been open long enough to have permitted the Turks and Bulgars to fight in France, the next war will have been fought and won.

We therefore have, so far, an open route by which three and a quarter million of German slaves can enter Western Europe. In Greece of course, due to ties of kinship and autocracy between the rulers, there is already a strong pro-German party, which, should Germany obtain a Teutonic peace, will seize the reins and again turn Greece over to the Kaiser. Thus another half million soldiers are added to the army of German minions. Of Rumania, Germany is frankly dubious. King Ferdinand has spoiled her plans more than once, and in spite of the fact that he is a Hohenzollern, bends distinctly to the racial tie which binds the Rumanian people to the other races using the Romance languages. Therefore, in order to place this state also within his grasp, it is ordained that, in return for peace, the Rumanians must force Ferdinand to abdicate in favor of his brother. But who is this brother? Prince William of Hohenzollern, a General of Prussian

infantry. Thus we have the Balkan chain complete, with every link of it perfectly welded on a German anvil to the German throne. Of Austria little need be added to what has already been said. As things are now, she is a slave, dominated in every way by her Teutonic master. Her fifty-two million population is Germany's to do with as Germany elects. There is no voice in the empire powerful enough to combat the German Kaiser's.

Now, let us turn westward, and look into the measures which Germany has adopted for herself to close the gaps which the war has torn in her man power. The German plans to increase her man power have taken several forms.

First, there was the authorized and systematic ravishing of the women of France and Belgium and the sending of the offspring from this official and bestial debauchery into Germany, to be reared in German institutions—to form a part of the future defense. Of this fact there is no longer any doubt. It has been definitely and clearly established by unimpeachable neutral testimony.

The deportation of the men of Belgium is another phase. These men will, of course,

never return to their homes if Germany can prevent it, and so in themselves will constitute an effective increase in the male population. But they will do more than this. Either voluntarily or through compulsion, they will form some sort of liaison, legitimate or otherwise, with the surplus women of Germany and will beget offspring which in twenty years will be available food for powder. As the excess of Germany's female population in 1914 was 800,000 and is now three times that number, this will prove a ready means of taking care of some of the surplus.

Another means of providing for a new and increased population is what is termed the lateral marriages. There are hundreds of thousands of young women in Germany, capable of bearing children, who are at present not so engaged either because unmarried or because of the absence of their husbands at the front. To German efficiency this is a waste of human material. God would not have endowed woman with this important function were it not intended that it should be used as frequently as the laws of nature permit. And to what better use could it be put than for the Fatherland?

Germany therefore proposes a "lateral" marriage. The general plan is outlined in the following quotation taken from a pamphlet published in Cologne, entitled: "The Secondary Marriage as only Means for the Rapid Creation of a New and Powerful Army and the Purification of Morality":

"Women in all classes of society who have reached a certain age are, in the interests of the Fatherland, not only authorized but called upon to enter into a secondary marriage, which is supported by personal inclination. Only a married man may be the object of this inclination, and he must have the consent of his married wife. This condition is necessary in order to prevent the mischief which otherwise might surely be expected.

"The offspring of these lawful secondary marriages bear the name of their mother, and are handed over to the care of the State, unless the mother assumes responsibility for them. They are to be regarded in every respect as fully equal members of society. The mothers wear a narrow wedding ring as a sign of their patriotism. The secondary marriage can be dissolved as soon as its object has been attained."

But, you may say, anyone may write and distribute a pamphlet, even though it may have an immoral purpose. True enough.

But the following is quoted from a leaflet, widely circulated among the soldiers at the front, not over the objection but with the consent and active coöperation of the officers:

"Soldiers, a grave danger assails the Fatherland by reason of the dwindling birth rate. The cradles of Germany are empty to-day; it is your duty to see that they are filled.

"You bachelors, when your leave comes, marry at once the girl of your choice. Make her your wife without delay.

"The Fatherland needs healthy children.

"You married men and your wives should put jealousy from your minds and consider whether you have not also a duty to the Fatherland.

"You should consider whether you may not honorably contract an alliance with one of the million of bachelor women. See if your wife will not sanction the relation.

"Remember, all of you, the empty cradles of Germany must be filled."

Here is a direct invitation to the individual issued to him with the sanction of the State, to disregard the sanctity of his marriage vows and to contract just such an alliance as the pamphleteer who was first quoted has advocated.

And if this be not enough, copies of the following circular letter have been found on a number of German prisoners captured by the British during the last two years:

“On account of all able-bodied men having been called to the colors, it remains the duty of all those left behind, for the sake of the Fatherland, to interest themselves in the happiness and health of the married women and maidens, by doubling or even trebling the births.

“Your name has been given us as a capable man, and you are herewith requested to take on this office of honor, and to do your duty in a proper German way. It must here be pointed out that your wife or fiancée will not be able to claim a divorce; it is in fact hoped that the women will bear this discomfort heroically for the sake of the war. You will be given the district of ———. Should you not feel capable of carrying on the task allotted to you, you will be given three days in which to name some one in your place. On the other hand, if you are prepared to take on a second district as well, you will become ‘*vrek offizier*’ and receive a pension.

“An exhibition of photographs of women and maidens in the district allotted to you is to be seen at the office of ———. You are requested to bring this letter with you. Your good work should begin immediately. A full report of results to be submitted by you after nine months.”

Proof, too, that these instructions are being carried out is abundant. We may disregard, if we are so inclined, the testimony of returned travelers. We cannot ignore the fact that the number of illegitimate births during 1917 showed an increase of 25 per cent. over 1916; and that a high German authority found it necessary to defend the statistics on the ground that it proved the fundamental morality of the German people—they were not practising birth control.

The next development concerned the women who have been widowed through the war and the men who have been so crippled as to be of no further use in the war area. The burgomasters of the various German towns have been instructed to obtain a list of all war widows in the districts presided over by them, a list of all cripples being furnished by the authorities. Advertisements are then to be placed in papers known to be read by women generally, for wives for the deserving cripples. Thus, playing the rôle of Cupid, the beneficent Government will bring together Venus and Adonis and, as is stated in official instructions, sow the seed of a new generation which will, in

the fullness of its manhood, take upon its shoulders the national defense.

Finally, in the discussion of population, we come to Germany's purpose in Africa. In November 1917, the semi-official *Cologne Gazette* announced that Germany, in addition to recovering her own African colonies, must take over those of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal. This was not mere braggadocio. It was put out in all seriousness as a means of meeting Germany's most crying need. The Colonial troops, this paper argues, have proven their value in the war in two ways: first, they have been a material addition to the forces in Europe and have given an excellent account of themselves on the battle field; second, they have been proven thoroughly competent to defend their own land against attacks from the outside and thus have guaranteed the title to their land in its present holders. If Germany had had a Colonial army five times the size of the one she possessed, the argument continues, the Allies would not have been able to bring their Colonial forces into Europe. Therefore, "Germany must have a strong Colonial army to strengthen her position and at the same time

weaken that of her enemies, who must never again be allowed to bring colored troops to their aid in Europe." This factor, however, need not be seriously considered. It is interjected here merely to show how present-day German thought is inclined.

In concluding the discussion of Germany's available population for a future war, we must regard with anxious eyes the situation in Russia, unstable and kaleidoscopic as it is. Under the terms of the treaty which the Bolsheviks made with Germany in February 1918 Germany has complete control of Poland, Courland, Lithuania and practically all of Livonia, which provinces contain, or did contain in 1914, a population of approximately twenty-five million men. Ukraine, nominally an independent governmental entity, is partially Germanized and the process now under way will be completed within the year. Ukraine also has a population of about the same volume, so that, through the Russian operations, Germany has acquired control of a population of fifty million, which population, unless the Entente succeed in ameliorating Russia's situation, threatens to provide

Germany with a large army for the next war against us.

We may therefore sum up the situation as it will exist after the close of the present war according to the German plans—and as it will exist in fact, unless Germany is decisively beaten in the field.

Germany, her territory unscathed by the present war, will rapidly recover from its effects, while her continental enemies, so bitterly ravished by war's sweep, will lag far behind in the process of regeneration. Under these conditions the mobilization of her man power and that of her vassal allies will place an overwhelming army, all German trained and German equipped, under the German command, to be thrown against her weakened adversaries in Europe. This time, according to the Germans' plan, the struggle is to be short. There is to be no miscalculation, no Marne, no Verdun.

Then the real German aim—not Hamburg-Bagdad but Calais-Bagdad—is to be achieved; and out of the present war will have sprung the World Power of which the Pan-German League has been dreaming since 1870 and of which Bernhardi wrote in 1912.

CHAPTER V

“WORLD EMPIRE OR DOWNFALL”

THE developments in Russia have given to Germany's eastward expansion a greater importance than even the Pan-German writer or Chancellor Michaelis even hoped. No conclusions as to the ultimate outcome of Russia's difficulties can be safely drawn; the Russians present the uncertain element in the situation. But the cloud which obscures Russia's future from our view does not conceal Germany in its shadow. Germany's intention and her object stand out clear in the picture's foreground.

To say that Germany is, in its dealings with Russia, indulging in an orgy of Pan-Germanism; that the extent of the Russian collapse intoxicated the German leaders and sent them reeling about Berlin, thoroughly drunk with dreams of power and conquest, is to state the truth in general terms. But details are needed to give the true picture.

When Finland, Ukraine and the Caucasus declared their independence and attempted to set up governments of their own, Germany not only encouraged but through skillful propaganda brought these results about. Germany's *penchant* for swallowing small states is well known even though her ability to digest them is narrow and limited—Russia has always been Germany's fear. The great numbers of the Russian people, the unlimited resources in food and raw materials of all kinds, the vast extent of her territory, have, in addition to exciting German cupidity, filled Germany with dread lest in some future day, this vast Russian wealth be mobilized for war and turned against the Teutonic powers. So, to avoid repetition, Germany first exerted her efforts toward a decentralization of Russian power through the simple expedient of dividing Russia into a number of small groups, none of which can have the power to resist. Then by Germanizing each group independently Germany hopes to keep the so-called independent states as German vassals. Therefore when Russia herself, and elements in Finland and Ukraine, resented the separation and took up arms against the new

governments, Germany rushed to their aid with a fanfare of trumpets and grandiloquent manifestoes of self-laudation for protecting against despotic aggression new states who desired to apply to themselves the principle of the right of peoples to determine their own government. But by this process of sending German troops into these states, Germany means to graft herself permanently onto their organization. She intends to take root with them and become a fixed part of them.

In the case of Finland the eventual result at which Germany aims is the control of Scandinavia and the conversion of the Baltic Sea into a German lake. If the German plans succeed Norway and Sweden will find it impossible to maintain more than a nominal independence. On land they could not face a victorious Germany and their safety at sea must depend on the British navy. In so far as their resources and raw materials are concerned, coercion will place them entirely at Germany's disposal when and as they may be required, unless the Allied armies break up this whole German scheme. This is a most important consideration in connection with a future war. Sweden has a


wealth of raw materials which in case of war Germany wishes to have available. The most important of these is a very high-grade iron ore of which Sweden produces annually about eight million tons. In the matter of food supplies, the net exports of cattle, pigs, and animal food—a product of which Germany has always need—aggregate annually about ninety million tons.

Ukraine is of even greater importance, aside from the question of population which has already been referred to. The present war is largely a war for raw materials—Germany wants to be self-supporting; she wants to include within her boundaries, or have fastened to her by bonds which only she can loosen, territory capable of producing all materials needed for home consumption in both war and peace. In 1914 there was a serious shortage. German imports were heavy both of food-stuffs and other basic materials. At least in so far as food is concerned, Ukraine can fill the want. Although comprising but one-seventh of the Russian population, Ukraine produces one-third of all Russian grain, and one-half of all Russian livestock. The great wealth



RUSSIA AND THE RESOURCES GERMANY

The two battle lines enclose the area occupied by German troops were being discussed. The important industrial centers of difficulty in delivering what supplies they may have to the Central Black Sea and the



MEANS TO ORGANIZE FOR HER OWN BENEFIT

while various peace negotiations on the basis of no annexations of Ukraine, although not served by many railroads, will have little effect on the Central Powers because of the excellent water route through the Danube River.

of Russia's potential iron supply and 90 per cent. of Russia's coal supply also are found in Ukraine. In the next war, therefore, as the Germans plan it, Russia would be helpless with Ukraine in Germany's hands.

Strategically Ukraine is of equal importance. Reference to a map of Russia will show Ukraine stretching eastward from Russian Poland, along the Black Sea to the western boundary of the Don Cossack country. Practically the full length of Ukraine is east of the new Russian border and is perpendicular to it.

‡ The configuration of the Russian boundary, as created by the treaty of peace, is such that with Ukraine and Germany working together, the heart of Russia is placed between the jaws of a pincers with no possible defense against their closing; a rift in the defense either on the western or southern boundary line, and all of Russia west of the meridian of Moscow would automatically pass into German control. Under the German plan, the plan which Germany has already carried out unless it is overturned by outside interference, Russia, as a potential military obstacle to Germany's world dominion, will not exist. Russia will be a country which

will exist only through Teutonic sufferance; its population will be dependent upon Germany for the food it eats and the clothes it wears. It will be deprived of the ability to defend itself against attack, even to develop its own resources. There will be but one avenue left: a treaty of alliance with Germany—commercial and military—in order that its future life may be guaranteed. This is what Germany intends. The complete defeat of the German armies is the only thing that is sure to prevent it.

In the Caucasus we are faced with an equal menace, while at the same time seeing, even more clearly, Germany's hand. The treaty which Germany finally forced upon Russia involved the cession to Turkey of Batoum, Kars and Ardahan. Batoum is the center of the Russian oil industry, which surpasses even that of the United States. It is nonsense to suppose that Germany did this out of regard for Turkey. In the first place Germany is not interested in the aggrandizement of Turkey unless in the process Germany be benefited. In the second place, the industrial life of Turkey makes no demand on oil, and has no

need whatever of the supply of Batoum which is the bulk of the entire output of Russia.

What, then, was behind the apparent German gift to Turkey? The oil from Batoum can be carried over the Black Sea to the mouth of the Danube and thence up the river to Austria and Germany. With Germany in command of the Dardanelles, as she is now, the Black Sea becomes an inland waterway not subject in any way to outside interference and hence subject to Germany's exclusive use. Thus Germany herself can obtain directly from this Turkish addition, a supply of crude oil not only sufficient for peace demands but for war purposes as well.

But there is more than this. If this cession of territory is permitted to stand, Germany has acquired a direct land route to India and the Far East—through Turkey to Persia and Afghanistan. Her desire for colonies will not let Germany stop at the Black Sea. Soon her hand will stretch out to the Pacific, the whole British Empire will be threatened; and, should Germany not endeavor to spread westward to South America and even Canada—which she will do—we must inevitably become involved

through the Philippine Islands—for remember the German plan is: *world empire or downfall*.

There is one other important raw material which the Near East can and will furnish to Germany. This is cotton. The blockade of Germany which was established by England and is now perfected by the United States, threatened to bring an end to the war through cutting off the base material for making explosive. This base material was cotton which furnished the cellulose content of gun-cotton. Germany anticipated the shortage in cotton, however, by making a wood-pulp substitute. This substitute serves the purpose but is not as reliable as cotton, a much higher percentage of German shells failing to explode than was the case when cotton was used.

If Germany's plans carry through, such shortage will not occur a second time. Mesopotamia was, in ancient days, the world's greatest cotton belt. Bagdad was the world's cotton center. Under Turkish rule, however, the agricultural value of Mesopotamia sank rapidly and finally dwindled to insignificant proportions. To-day, indeed, Mesopotamia is practically a desert uninhabited except along

its natural watercourses. The conditions which made this country wealthy and populous can be readily restored. It is almost entirely a question of irrigation and organization and both of these the genius of Germany can supply. Long before the children which Germany is making every effort to have brought into the world, by the means which have been described, reach the age when they will be able to bear arms, Mesopotamia can be brought back to its former state of productiveness and can furnish Germany with all the cotton she may need for the prosecution of war.

In Russia's complete surrender, Rumania has, very naturally, been hopelessly involved. And here also Germany's purpose is clearly manifest. Germany wants, and has wanted for years, full control of the mouth of the Danube because of its relation to what might be termed the interior water route to the Near East. Therefore the only terms of peace which Rumania could secure (and Rumania had to take what she could get) involved the cession to Bulgaria—which is to Germany—of Dobrudja and its northern boundary the Danube, including the mouth of the river. Rumania

has thus had to give up her entire coastline and is hemmed in on all sides by Teutonic nations, so that she must either give up her national existence or become a German vassal. Under these circumstances Germany would control all the oil wealth of Rumania—which is very great—and all Rumania’s grain, which also is a tremendous asset.

Therefore, for the next war in Europe, Germany intends to be well fed, intends that her army and her people shall be able to have the fat of the land—and this will happen—if, of course, we allow the present arrangements to continue. Germany, moreover, has taken care to provide herself with every item of raw material of which Europe and Asia boast. Nothing is to be lacking except the one element—rubber—which is indigenous only to tropical climates. It remains now only for Germany to bring the present struggle to a close so that she can begin to consolidate these accessions to her dominion, to stabilize and perfect their governments in accordance with her interests, and her preparations for the next war will be practically complete.

CHAPTER VI

GERMANY'S PEACE DRIVES—PAST AND TO COME

WE have seen in the preceding pages that if we follow to their logical conclusion the ambitious dreams of Germany, we are forced to the inference that the German plan involves the extension of the Teutonic boundary line to the west. We have seen that Germany has been checked in this ambition, and that—since not in this war can it be realized—she has deliberately set about, while this war is still in progress, to prepare for another war to be fought later; and further, that she has succeeded in forging the needed links which bind to herself the producers of all necessary raw materials for war, and hence in this respect is eminently ready.

What then is Germany's next move? Having accomplished in the east what she set out to accomplish, and recognizing her inability to push on in the west, Germany wants peace.

We may, then, expect strong peace waves to be sent out, an intense propaganda to influence civilian sentiment, in order that the ground may be prepared for a definite peace proposal. This proposal, when it comes, will take the form of an offer of extensive concessions in the west in return for a free hand in the adjustment of eastern matters.

But Germany does not want peace for the sake of peace, but peace for the sake of war; peace so that, relatively unscathed by the present conflict, she may, when the time is ripe, launch another war in which her full aims may be realized.

In the conferences with Russia at Brest-Litovsk, peace was Germany's for the asking. But she declined to ask it or to take it, although she expressed herself ready to accept the principles which the Bolshevik delegates put forth. Failing to agree on details, Russia announced that a state of war with Germany no longer existed and disbanded the Russian army. Without going through the formality of making a peace agreement, Germany, then, was left with all she had asked for; every point on which disagreement existed at Brest-

Litovsk was automatically decided in Germany's favor.

Did Germany then take what she had claimed and cease fighting? Quite the contrary. Ignoring the terms of the armistice which she had made, just as she ignored her treaties in 1914, Germany recommenced hostilities, and, having deceived the Russians into disbanding their army, advanced almost unopposed upon Petrograd. Germany's object in this is not to hold the Russian capital. But she does intend to get firmly within her grasp Courland, Livonia, Lithuania and Ukraine (the last mentioned of course under the guise of a separate treaty of peace). When her hold on these provinces is secure, Germany will, if she cannot get a better settlement, propose to the Allies a peace based on a free hand in the east in return for the abandonment of occupied Belgium and France, with perhaps an indemnity in order that they may be reconstituted.

Teutonic reasoning in such a case is not difficult to follow. Germany knows the temper, the mental processes, the general attitude of the civilian populations of the Allied countries. What would the great mass of the American

people feel if Germany were to make such a proposal? Many of our people, taught to believe that we are at war because Belgium was invaded and France struck down; taught that we are fighting for a governmental principle, for humanity and for civilization, interpreted in terms of western Europe, do not for the most part understand that we have any interest in far-off Russia, in more-distant Mesopotamia and Persia. The Balkan States are outside of the realm of our national ken; hazily we remember that there was a war there in 1912; but what it was about and its relation to the present conflict we do not realize. We do not know that our interests are as closely wrapped up in the history of the Balkan Peninsula, and in what happens to these small countries through the war, as if they were geographically as close as the island of Cuba. Consequently, when Germany comes to us with the proposition that she will vacate her western conquests, will even pay an indemnity for the devastation she has wrought, will or will not the majority of us want peace to come, believing that we have obtained the results for which we took up arms?

The same though in less degree is true of the mass of British and French peoples. But being more centralized, not scattered over an enormous area as is the population of the United States, these peoples are more easy to reach and to teach.

But if America demands peace, France and England may have to follow our lead. It is doubtful now if either nation could stand the blow of America making peace with Germany. And yet that is what Germany is trying to accomplish. She is willing to go to any lengths to induce us to withdraw from the struggle, feeling sure that, in such event, France and England will have no choice. With the fulfillment of the German aims in Russia therefore, we shall see a tremendous effort on the part of Germany to obtain peace, with France and Belgium held out as baits.

This procedure is nothing new. At various times during the past two years Germany has done the same thing. Having obtained in the east what she desired—and this was accomplished before the end of 1915—Germany has seized every occasion that seemed propitious to sound the Entente on a peace program.

These occasions have in almost every case been signalized by a German victory. Let us see how well they have synchronized. Germany was told at the Marne that she was not to be permitted to win the war. Thrown back from Paris, she stretched out her hand for Calais, only to have her knuckles rapped at the Battle of Ypres. Later, the other hand, stretching again at Calais, was forced to be withdrawn, smarting with the pain of another rapping, delivered also at Ypres. Again, the lesson of these battles was emphasized in Russia before Riga. After a triumphal march through Poland, beginning at the Dunajec River at the gates of Silesia and ending only at the banks of the Dwina, the German army, just as it was about to seize control of Russia through a complete military decision, was suddenly halted and pinned fast at the great Tirul Marsh.

Then it was that the first peace overture was made. Germany did not speak openly of course; she never does. But the subterranean channel of the German propaganda was used to test the sentiment of the Entente. The effort, however, was weak and non-productive. The western Allies had not yet begun to fight;

they were only accumulating power. So the seed fell on sterile soil. After waiting to give her propaganda time to sink in, Germany, when she saw that no progress was being made, pulled in her horns and delayed further efforts for a more auspicious occasion—an occasion which she later attempted to create.

The attack on Serbia, which was the nearest approach to a definitive campaign that Germany had fought, was the next step. When the destruction of the Serbs was complete, Germany again bid for peace, through the same channels—insidious propaganda. But this peace drive, somewhat more forceful than its predecessor, was broken on the rock of the Allies' sense of decency and right, and as before, dissolved in mist.

Then came the Battle of Verdun, the most terrific defeat of the war, which was interrupted four months after its inception by the Battle of the Somme. This battle is an extremely important consideration in connection with the German peace moves. Teutonic leaders boasted and sincerely believed that their lines on the western front were too strong to be successfully attacked. All of the world's knowl-

edge of military engineering had been exhausted in preparing them for defense. Germany did not even consider the possibility that they could be beaten in to the point of endangering any part of their positions. But slowly, yard by yard, the French and British plowed their way through, preparing their attacks with a weight of artillery that Germany did not dream they possessed. It was the first positive proof that Germany had been given that their lines could be strained to the breaking point; it was a proof Germany could not ignore. There was no longer even in the German mind the complete belief in a German victory in the west. Even to them it had become improbable.

As the French and British artillery continued to hammer this thought relentlessly into the German mind, another peace propaganda was started. This time it was more widespread, more determined, and more effective than any of its predecessors. This effort was very insidious, far-reaching and well disguised, and not altogether unsuccessful. It was at this period, in December 1916, that the President of the United States, although disclaiming German instigation, moved for peace on the basis

Germany ostensibly desired, a peace without victory.

But this also failed, the answer of the Allies being a new offensive in the west, more pressing, more disastrous in its effect on the German casualty lists than the Battle of the Somme.

Having failed to obtain results through political channels, an appeal was made to the head of the Church of Rome, Pope Benedict. There was founded in Switzerland in the spring of 1917 an organization known as "The Catholic International Peace League" (shades of the Holy Alliance!), an organization made up almost entirely of German and Austrian Catholics. A delegation from this organization in the early summer went to Rome to induce the Pope to try to arrange for peace. At the same time all possible pressure was exerted through the person of the Austrian Emperor and by the Austrian cardinals. The result was all that Germany expected in so far as the Pope was concerned. Pope Benedict, in August 1917, made a plea to the warring powers to conclude a peace on the general basis which had been outlined by President Wilson eight months before, a peace without victory, a peace the

basis of which should be no annexations and no indemnities.

But just as Germany had failed to stir up a Holy Mohammedan war through the call of the Turkish Sultan, so the mass of Catholics in the world refused to respond to the Pope's message. The truth was that the Allies had by this time come to know Germany and to understand her methods. The lessons which she had spent three years in teaching had been well learned. The Allies realized that if they did not win the war, they would lose it; they realized that if peace were made on the basis of the drawn game, with an ostensible return to the *status quo ante*, it would be a German peace and a German victory. Therefore although this effort did elicit a reply—the position of the Pope entitled him to that no matter in whose interests his proposals were made—the attempt to obtain peace went the way of its predecessors.

And then early in 1918 arose the Russian situation, Russia thoroughly in the grip of the Teutonic hordes; Russia, without a force of any kind, however meager, to oppose a German attack, after Germany's terms of peace had

been completely acceded to. And on top of this came a terrific German drive in the West to make the Allies more receptive to a new peace plan.

If therefore we may judge from historical precedents which this war has already furnished us with, we shall sooner or later see a renewal of this peace propaganda in a more virulent form than ever. On our answer to this proposal—and I am speaking to Great Britain, France, and Italy as well as to the United States—will depend the fate of the world; on our answer will rest the decision as to whether international right shall prevail over brute force and lustful aggression, whether the world shall continue to be inhabited by free peoples, or whether it shall become Teutonic to the complete obliteration of all other nationality and race. For if Germany is permitted to emerge from this war with a profit, whether it be east or west; if she is permitted to make peace without it having been drilled into the German mind that war does not pay, she will fight again as soon as she can get ready, and, this next time, will achieve her ambitions in full.

CHAPTER VII

GERMAN HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE PRESENT WAR

IF within the next twenty-five years, Germany should launch another war on Europe, what would be the effect on America? Why should we be concerned with it? Previous to August 1914, there existed a popular superstition, usually referred to as Germany's traditional friendship for the United States. This superstition seems, however, to owe its origin to Prussia's traditional hatred of England rather than to any feeling of friendship for a people whose every principle of government was directly antithetical to all that Prussia represented. During the American Revolution, Frederick the Great stated to an American diplomat that *Prussia rejoiced at every American victory*. This was accepted as indicative of a real feeling of friendship and was the beginning of the fiction which eventually was to

conceal the true Prussian state of mind. But Prussia—and the Prussia of the beginning of the 19th century is truly the Germany of the 20th—as a matter of fact has not only been secretly hostile to us almost from the beginning of our existence as a nation, but has at heart despised us.

We achieved our independence when Europe first began to throb with the birth pains of a new republican spirit, when the trenchant pen of Voltaire had begun to loosen the foundations upon which rested the French monarchy of the Bourbons. Prussia heard the rumblings of this new spirit with alarm. The very life of her entire system depended upon monarchy. Worshiping even then the gospel of the rule of might, of force, she believed that the only essential possession of a state was a supreme military organization. Having that, all else could be attained. But such an organization was incompatible with republicanism. Government by the people, rather than by a single ruler responsible only to himself, is not an organization calculated to plan aggressive war. Government by autocracy labors under no such disadvantages. Where one man's voice

is law, where there is no accountability to an electorate, the mobilization and directing of all the resources and all the power of a state, the unification and concentration of its effort—all toward one goal—is entirely possible and is not, indeed, particularly difficult of accomplishment. Moreover, such a government is soulless, it is machine-made and machine-directed. But it is a perfect war-making conception. A republic, or a democracy, is adapted primarily to the practice of the arts of peace. It is to a certain extent idealistic; and, pitted against monarchy on the battlefield, works with obvious disadvantage.

All this Prussia realized, and, being an essentially war-making state, was visibly perturbed at the possibility of the republican spirit infecting not her own population alone, but also that of the other German states, not yet united under the Confederation.

The events of the decade following the war of 1812 tended to augment greatly this perturbation. The spirit of independence, the love of individual liberty which had first infected us and had led us to break from the empire of George III (a German Prince, be it noted, and

not an Anglo-Saxon) and later inspired the people of France, quickly spread to other parts of the world. The Spanish colonies in South America, taking advantage of Spain's preoccupation in the affairs of Europe, threw off the Spanish yoke, and declared their independence. To Prussia, this proved the breaking point. The principles advocated by those favoring republicanism were becoming too popular; so Prussia took the first step to crush the spirit of popular government once for all and to stop the schismatic and heretical disbelief in the divine right of kings to rule.

Under the guise of promoting the interests of Christianity, the King of Prussia effected a combination with the Emperor of Austria—another autocrat—and Alexander of Russia, a religious fanatic; this combination being known as the Holy Alliance. The real object of this alliance was anti-Christian. It was not religious but political—to put down the insurrections which were rampant in the Spanish colonies, and to check the growth of republican tendencies throughout the world. Since the United States, by its action in 1776, was truly the cornerstone of the great temple

of personal freedom, it was really at the United States, its Declaration of Independence, and its constitutional rule that the Prussian blow was aimed; not at the Government itself, but at the principle on which the Government was founded. It was the first act of German antagonism.

Fortunately for us, the British Premier, Lord Canning, became aware of the real nature of the Prussian scheme and, acting on the information furnished by him to our Minister, Mr. Rush, President Monroe announced to the world the policy by which we proposed to be governed in all questions between Europe and the American continent. This policy, our code of foreign relations, is the Monroe Doctrine, and, be it noted, it was leveled at Prussian aggression. That was the beginning of Prussia's virulent hostility toward us. It was often cloaked, often tempered by expediency to the point where, as a people, we felt that, at bottom, we had the German friendship and good will. But underlying all German protestations of attachment to us and to our institutions, there was always a bitter resentment at our balking the purposes of the Holy

Alliance and frustrating the scheme to place and keep the greater portions of the American continent under the rule of European autocracy.

Prussia alone was not strong enough as a power to take openly a position of unfriendliness. Our rapid growth, our potential strength, and the development of our huge resources prohibited such a position. Moreover, the Prussian attitude was not reflected in the other German states. But after the formation of the present German Empire in 1870 with Prussia the dominant state and the King of Prussia the nation's emperor, the smoldering embers of the resentment over the Monroe Doctrine were fanned into flame and Germany's attitude changed into a constant challenge of our rights, the Monroe Doctrine being the principal object of attack.

The new Germany came into existence under the guidance of Bismarck, the most astute as well as the most unscrupulous statesman of Europe. He saw as an end only the aggrandizement of Germany, and to him the end justified the means, whatever they might be. He saw in the United States only a step by which Ger-

many might rise to still greater power, American wealth was to him part of the potential wealth of Germany, which, when the time was ripe, she would reach out her hand and take. His whole philosophy about America was summed up in his remark that the United States was a fat hog, waiting to be stuck, and he might have added, that Germany some day would try to do the sticking. He was the first Pan-German and from this protagonist has come the dream of German world dominion from which sprang the World War. Although Bismarck and his successors in office maintained, for the most part, a semblance of friendship for the United States, there were constant outcroppings of hostility, which, if we had not been blinded by the false sense of security furnished by the two oceans by which we are limited, we would not have been slow to recognize. And recognition would have meant some sensible plan of preparation for the war in which we are now engaged.

Several small incidents served to warn our Government that this hostility existed and that any show of friendliness was only a pretence demanded by expediency, but it was not

until 1898 that the American people as a whole received their first warning. The trouble started before we declared war on Spain, through an insult given by Prince Henry of Prussia to Admiral Dewey in Hong Kong. An apology was forthcoming, it is true, but the intention was evident and did not escape Dewey or the Government.

Later, when it seemed evident that we were to declare war on Spain, Germany endeavored by all the means in her power, to form against us a European coalition headed by herself and Austria, and to use the armies and navies of the various states concerned to forbid our going to war. The real reason for this step was the same which prompted Germany to form the Triple Alliance which provoked the Monroe Doctrine—to prevent the spread of republicanism on this continent and its neighboring islands. Through the action of the British, who refused to join the coalition, the scheme was balked. But Germany was not yet ready to acknowledge her defeat.

Her subsequent actions are well known though, at this time, but little remembered or appreciated at their full value.

After the defeat by Admiral Dewey's squadron of the Spanish squadron at Manila, and before the land defenses of Manila Bay were taken, Dewey established a blockade and proclaimed to neutral powers the fact of the blockade's existence. Under international law, when a blockade is declared neutrals first ascertain whether it is effective and hence binding, and, upon assuring themselves that such is the case, must accept the anchorages which the blockading commander assigns to them. The German squadron at Manila, which was under the command of Admiral Von Diederich, undertook to disregard completely the instructions of Admiral Dewey as to the location of his anchorages, a proceeding to which Dewey took very serious objection. In fact the German boats undertook to come in and out of the Bay as if no blockade existed in theory or in fact. Finally a German cruiser loaded supplies to the occupants of the beleaguered Spanish fortresses, a clear violation of neutrality if not, indeed, an act of war. This proved the end of Dewey's patience and he sent an ultimatum to the German admiral which was all but a challenge to fight. There

was then a temporary back down. The Germans were not ready to press the point too hard, and Admiral von Diederich disavowed the action of his subordinate.

Later, however, when Dewey began the battle of Manila Bay by driving his ships in against the Spanish fortresses, the Germans attempted to get Dewey's fleet between themselves and the Spanish batteries. Whether it was the intention to open fire simultaneously with the Spanish guns or not, will never be known. Whatever the plan was, it was circumvented by the British fleet which immediately placed itself between the German and the American fleets so that the Germans could not fire on Dewey's vessels without hitting the British. Germany had no idea of challenging the power of the British navy, although for the possession of the Philippines they might have tried issues with ours. Therefore they fell back and in a few days left the harbor. But as may be seen the entire attitude was one of open unfriendliness which they were ready to extend to hostility if a propitious moment presented itself.

Not until 1902 did Germany make the next

positive move against us. Venezuela owed to Germany, in common with several of the other European powers, large sums of money which Germany persuaded the other powers to join her in trying to collect. Accordingly the now famous Pacific blockade was formed. But it developed that it was Germany's intention to go further than this. She wished to occupy at least a part of Venezuela temporarily, presumably until the debt was paid. It was a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, but a challenge which Germany made alone, as the other powers stood out for arbitration and refused to join in such an obvious land-hunting expedition. But President Roosevelt proved conclusively to the German ambassador that he was ready to engage the United States in war for the protection of this long-standing and very necessary foreign policy, and the Kaiser, who was behind the move from the beginning, was forced to back down and join the other powers in the arbitration.

Germany has tried therefore to force us to abandon the Monroe Doctrine. Not resting on these manifest efforts, however, she has been constantly and for a long time preparing

the ground in a way which we could not take objection to. In order to get her grip on South America just as she did in the case of Turkey and tried to do with China, she has sent her soldiers to several of the smaller countries of South America to train the local armies. She has sent out under the direction of her Foreign Office, large settlements to Brazil and Argentina, which are German, always will be German, and have not the slightest intention of permitting themselves to become assimilated with the local populations.

Only during 1916 and 1917 did we learn the extent to which we were permeated by her spy system, how she was organized here in the United States for war or for sabotage, how she had carefully selected even the parts of the United States in which her settlers should take root, assembling them in localities where the German leaders felt they could most effectively coöperate against us in case of war. Careful lists have been kept of the men here who could be counted upon to work in the interests of Germany, and these men have been used to the utmost. The now famous Zimmermann letter, in which Germany pro-

posed to give Mexico, in case of war between the United States and Germany, large stretches of our territory in return for coöperative offensive measures against us, is public property, still fresh in our minds.

In view of these evidences of hostility, we should indeed be addle-pated optimists if we did not realize the danger we are in. In the opening chapter of this book, we have seen that Germany's scheme involved expansion to the west in Europe. The relation to the United States of the Pan-German scheme was not mentioned. But the European matter was foremost in the German mind and was the first step which had to be taken. But Germany did not intend to stop there. There is too much wealth in this "fat hog, waiting to be stuck," as Bismarck called us, not to excite the envy and cupidity of Berlin. And we know enough now, or should know enough, to realize that when Germany wants anything and it is worth the price, she will go to war to get it. The only question involved is: Will it pay? not Is it right?

If we had remained neutral, and Germany won the war, Germany would have the guns

and we would have the money. To this state of affairs, there is but one answer. But lest we think that this is questionable, there may be cited several incidents which will prove that Germany would, in such case, send her guns to get the money. In 1898, Admiral Dewey was told by the German Admiral von Goetzen, that "in about fifteen years my country will begin a great war. Some months after we have done our job in Europe we shall take New York and probably Washington, and we shall keep them for a time. We shall extract one or two billions of dollars from New York and other towns." You may say that it was nearly twenty years ago that this spirit was manifested. Even so; has it become apparent in any way that this spirit has changed for the better? On the contrary, has it not been carefully fostered until it is still more gross, still more unscrupulous? The Kaiser himself has said to the American Ambassador that he will stand no nonsense from America after the war. What is this if not an open threat to dictate to us after the war and put us in our proper place with reference to Germany?

But there is something more definite even

than this, something of which our Ambassador was cognizant and of which the Foreign Relations Committee in both the House of Representatives and Senate were apprised. The Germans, with their genius for detail, were keeping a list of the men in their army who were alleged to be killed or wounded through the use of American ammunition supplied to the Allies. This list was translated into dollars and cents, the value of each man being made to depend upon his rank and station. This was to be the indemnity we were to be made to pay after the war. By January 1917, it had reached an inconceivable sum, a sum sufficiently large to pay the entire cost to Germany of the war. And we may be certain that the alternative with which we would have been confronted, would have been to pay or fight.

Do not let us deceive ourselves that this "debt" will be canceled by the treaty of peace; on the contrary it will be merely suspended. And if Germany can succeed in making a peace now that will permit her to fight again, we shall be involved in the next war and involved not in Europe but in America,

for Germany will build her fences well in Latin America before that time comes and will fight us from the south as well as from the east. The Monroe Doctrine will become an issue of the past, Germany will pay no more attention to it than she has done to her treaties with Belgium and with us since 1914.

Wide preparations have already been made in Latin America to aid Germany in this American enterprise. Large colonies of Germans have been established in many South American states, and colonists, under the direction of Berlin, have formed compact centralized settlements, with their own municipal organizations, their own clubs (among which are many rifle clubs)—waiting only the German word to strike. In Peru, for example, there are two thousand Germans; in Paraguay, three thousand; in Colombia, three thousand; in Venezuela, five thousand; in Uruguay, five thousand; in Chili, fifteen thousand; in Argentina, sixty thousand; in Brazil, four hundred thousand. These numbers are not scattered over the various states, be it remembered; they are concentrated, mobilized in fact, waiting but for orders from Berlin.

The following appears in Otto Tannenberg's work, "Greater Germany, the Work of the Twentieth Century," published in 1911:

"Germany will take under her protection the republics of Argentina, Chili, Uruguay, and Paraguay, the Southern third of Bolivia . . . and also that part of Southern Brazil in which German culture prevails. . . . Chili and Argentina will preserve their language and their autonomy, but we shall require that German be taught in the schools as a second language. Southern Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay are countries of German culture and there German will be the national tongue."

Should this prophecy ever be fulfilled, we shall again have to fight for independence, and, as before, it will be against the aggression of a Teuton prince.

CHAPTER VIII

NO PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY

THE foregoing pages have depicted a condition which threatens the future peace of the world. At a moment when we see the world torn to pieces in the most Titanic struggle of history; when we see being poured out upon the battlefields of Europe the lives of the world's best and bravest men, and all of the world's treasure; when we are called upon to send our beloved sons into the maw of the cannon's mouth, and to endure ourselves suffering and want in order that our men may "carry on"; in such a situation we see, formed from the breath of a foul, barbaric nation, the hellish specter of another war to be fought as soon as the monster can complete the preparations even now going on. We see this future struggle waged for the same cause as that for which we are now engaged, for peace, for civilization, for the right of future generations to live and

breathe God's free air without Teutonic sanction.

There is but one solution to the awful problem which confronts us. Regardless of the cost in men and treasure, this war must go on and on until, through victory, we can so dictate the terms of peace, that Germany cannot fight again and throw the entire world into another such paroxysm of blood and slaughter. But before such terms can be drawn up, there are certain underlying facts we must understand lest we be drawn into a premature peace, thinking we have attained the ends for which we are fighting when we have not.

The first of these facts is the nature of our enemy. Germany has never waged a war for any cause but profit. Never has she been stirred to fight for national standards or national ideals,—because the only ideal Germany possesses is profit. Germany is the tabernacle of materialism and the German Kaiser is its high priest. This, perhaps, is so because Germany has grown into an empire solely through military conquest. Germany represents not a peaceful growth but a steady accretion formed by preying on neighboring states. Worship-

ing only a money god, and having seen that war has always proved for them a profitable enterprise, Germany has come to recognize as the guiding principle of the world, not the philosophy of Christ, but that of the brute. Force, brute force, is their god and that only do they worship.

Having launched the present cataclysm for gain, Germany has already found it the most profitable venture on which she has ever embarked. Let us see where this value lies.

First there is the matter of territory and the possibilities, exclusive to Germany, which it opens up. It is difficult if not impossible to place any definite value in dollars and cents on the vast territory which Germany has acquired since 1914. Belgium, with all of its coal and iron; France, with its great resources in the same materials; Russia, with its great granaries, its livestock, its wealth in minerals; Anatolia, with its great deposits of oil and metals; the value of these will run into many billions of dollars.

Almost as valuable is the exclusive right which Germany has obtained to the development of the resources of Turkey, and certain important parts of Russia. In addition to

this Germany has made many millions through selling the products of the French and Belgian mines to her destitute allies. Add further the indemnities Germany has levied, her thefts of private property in the occupied regions, the vast collections of art treasures she has removed and has sent to her capitals, and we have a total which staggers the imagination.

When a people are so constituted that they are confirmed in a materialistic philosophy, is it to be wondered at that, when they find themselves so richly endowed through war operations, they should be addicted to war as a national occupation? In Germany, too, we have people part of whom regard their country with a religious fervor and fanaticism and feel truly, if they feel at all, that the acts of Germany's rulers are in furtherance of a divine mission and that in consequence any opposition to these acts is of itself wrong. The other part of the population is engaged in the hypocritical trade of fostering this fanaticism, of fanning the flame it has ignited and of instilling into ready minds the doctrine of Germany's superiority over other peoples of the world and her consequent right to exercise world dominion.

To this population, part fanatic and part venally ambitious, the future peace of the world, unless it be an all-German world, is without merit and unworthy of consideration. The end to be gained is either the immediate aggrandizement of Germany or a peace which will provide a basis for future extension of Germany's boundaries through another war of conquest.

It is useless to point to the activities of the socialistic and pacifist groups in Germany as evidence that it will be impossible for Germany again to break the bonds of peace, and let loose the dogs of war on a heavily burdened world. The German socialist is not far removed from the Pan-German and the Junker. The socialist of Germany had full opportunity in the case of Russia to prove his sincerity and force the hand of the Junker party, had he so desired. The Bolsheviki of Russia offered peace on a basis which German socialists claimed was just. Germany was waging a war of defense and of defense only said the socialists; she desired only to live and let live; and to live within her own borders on terms of peace with her neighbors. But the arrant hypocrisy of the socialist

became apparent the moment the Russian army had voluntarily given up its power of resistance. Then there was no question of desiring peace for the love of peace. Gone were his scruples, his creed, his political ideals. His vision extended only to land, the undefended land of his neighbor which he possessed the power to take—and he stretched out his hand and took.

Scheidemann, the socialist leader of the Reichstag, is the most obvious hypocrite of them all, talking in circles on general subjects. When any question arises affecting the army or the extension of Germany's boundaries through theft from her neighbors, his voice and vote are always at the disposal of the military party. He votes for all of the war loans, he is on record advocating the retention of Belgium; his voice has yet to be heard condemning the treachery against Russia.

And the German pacifist, what has been his record on the war? We may judge of this through Maximilian Harden, the leader of the pacifists, the "irrepressible foe of Kaiserism" whom the Government, so we are told, would give untold sums to be rid of, if only it dared. As

if the Government could not still his voice and break his pen if it so desired! We have learned of the power of the German censor; his unquestioned ability to prevent the publication of any items of news or discussion that do not meet with his approval. If, then, Harden is still printing what seems republican or pacifist matter, is it not because the Government wants it printed? And, further, is it not obvious that this is done because Harden is one with those in power, and that by permitting him to continue in his present view the Government is merely blinding the world by the show of liberalism?

If this seems far-fetched, let us see who Harden was, both before the war and since it broke out. Before the war he was one of the most rabid of the Pan-Germans. In the early pages of this book there is a quotation from one of his articles which appeared in his paper, the *Zukunft*, in 1911; in the same year we find the following from his pen in the same journal:

“The hostile arrogance of the Western Powers releases us from all our treaty obligations, throws open the doors of our verbal prison house and forces the German Empire, resolutely defending

her vital rights, to revive the ancient Prussian policy of conquest."

In November 1914, we find this Junker-pacifist making the statement which has already been quoted but which justifies repetition:

"This war has not been forced on us by surprise; we desired it and were right to do so. Germany goes into it because of her immutable conviction that what she has accomplished gives her the right to wider outlets for her activities and more room in the world."

This attitude was maintained consistently until 1916 when the possibility of defeat in the west dawned. Then this very agile-minded gentleman became suddenly converted to pacifism and to a belief in the virtues of democracy. This regeneration synchronizes too well with the Battle of the Somme to deceive any one but a simpleton or a German. We may therefore dismiss as untenable the theory that a war after the war will be impossible because of the opposition by the socialists and the pacifists. There will be no opposition from these sources; on the contrary, there will be active coöperation if it can be shown that the enterprise will produce a profit.

An understanding of this phase of Germany—the phase of native, inborn hypocrisy—is necessary to a clear understanding of our enemy in this war, for unless we do understand him and have a vivid realization of his motives and his weapons, there is danger of being caught in the snare he is already laying for us—the snare of a premature peace.

But to come to an appreciation of the requirements of the treaty of peace with which we propose to end the war, we must go further; we must keep before our mind's eyes constantly just what we are fighting for. In so far as the United States is concerned—and we are concerned to the same extent and in the same way as the other Entente Powers—we must realize that we entered the war solely for self-defense—but for the defense of the future as well as of the present. The defense of America but for the moment is certainly not worth the sacrifices of our men and the pouring out of our treasure. If future generations are not to profit they should not have to pay the cost, and it is upon them that much of the load will fall. Our program must therefore include the future defense.

For the first time in our history we are called upon, by unborn generations, to shake off the provincialism which our limiting oceans have thrust upon us and work out our problem from the formula, not of national but of international peace and safety. For upon the peace of Europe depends the peace of the United States. Even if it were true, which it is not, that Germany does not intend as part of her future plan to attack us and extend her damnable system into Latin America, the year 1917 has shown that it is impossible for a great war to exist in Europe without the United States being drawn into it. Nations to-day are too closely bound by the most intimate commercial ties; the time of passage across the ocean is too short to enable any great power to remain neutral in such a case. The oceans are not defensive barriers. As a matter of history they have brought us into four wars in European waters before this. In 1797 we began active hostilities against France in defense of our right to the sea. For the same cause we fought the war of 1812 and two conflicts with the Barbary pirates, one in 1801 and one in 1815. The oceans are lines of communication and so they must remain.

Modern invention has spanned the gap of three thousand miles with a bridge of but three and a half days. What affects Europe has always affected us. Now it affects us more rapidly and vitally than ever before. We have not even the isolation of slow communication. We could not have it if we would; we would not if we could.

Since, then, we are as intimately concerned as are the countries of Europe both with this war and with the next, we must clearly understand the ends for which we are fighting and the nature of the war itself. The world must be made safe for peace. We are not fighting for governmental forms; in this war they mean nothing. We are not fighting over international boundaries; these mean less. Those things are at stake which are bigger than any people, any state, any form of government. Decency, civilization, Christianity are in the balance against savagery, barbarism, paganism. Which shall rule the world? The answer to this determines the nature of our battle. We are not concerned with Germany's form of government. It is entirely inconsistent with the genius of our institutions to attempt to dictate to the people

of Germany what form of government they should live under. But we are concerned in the capacity of that government, whatever form it may take, for mischief. No nation has ever objected to Germany's use of power; but her abuse of it we do object to and abominate. She has shown that she cannot be trusted with power; she should therefore have her power shorn from her.

Without attempting to discuss in detail the specific terms of peace which will accomplish this, we may lay down, as the principle to which the peace treaty must conform, this formula: The means, the power, and the ability to make war must be forever removed from Germany and from all things German. German fortresses must be wrecked, German munition plants dismantled; as a war-making state Germany must cease to exist. The peace treaty must be of such a character that, even though Germany should break it, her power to do evil, through such breach, shall not exist. There must be no peace without victory.

This program must be the American peace platform. These are our terms, our irreducible minimum. Nor do they represent only a ten-

tative sketch to be debated around a conference table. And these terms can only be imposed upon Germany through the defeat, the dispersion, or the capture of the German army. To defeat Germany; to sit with her, not at the council table but on the field of battle and, as we receive the swords of her commanders, to dictate peace—this is what is demanded of us.

There are, however, those who, in answer to the constantly recurring peace waves which the German propagandists send forth, contend that, in the name of humanity, we should make every effort to bring about a conference of the leaders of all the warring powers at which their differences could be openly discussed and possibly reconciled. To enter such a conference with a victorious Germany—and Germany is the victor up to the moment—would mean a surrender of all we have fought for and the throwing away of all the sacrifices that the world has made.

This was the experience of Russia. Acting on a theory which was supposedly the expression of a high idealism, Russia convened the conference at Brest-Litovsk, and, empty-handed, attempted to deal with a Germany gorged

with the fruits of conquest. Having nothing to exchange, Russia obtained nothing. Not only did Germany fail to restore what she had stolen, but she added to her thefts.

Again let us suppose that Germany, at such a conference, could be induced to give up without adequate compensation the loot she has acquired and return to the *status quo ante*. What would this lead to? Merely a restoration of the situation out of which grew the present war. And he would be more than a sentimental idealist, he would be a fool, who, having seen a certain result spring from a certain cause or status, would deny that the same cause or status would again produce exactly the same result. And were another war to be fought, can any one doubt who the victor would be? Therefore, as far as the civilized world is concerned (and this does not include Germany) the application of the "No annexations, no indemnities" formula would not bring peace.

Finally, to go into such a conference with Germany presupposes equality with Germany. Between Germany and any decent people there is no common ground; any more than there can be common ground between the lust-filled beast

that ravishes a woman and the husband of the victim. To agree to a return to the *status quo ante* would be to admit either that all the belligerents are equally guilty—Belgium with Germany; France and England with Austria; the United States, Italy, and Serbia with Bulgaria and Turkey—or that none are guilty; that the war just happened. But this, on its face, is ridiculous; it is untrue; and for the Allies to admit it would be to place themselves on a plane with Germany,—liars and hypocrites, whited sepulchers in whom honor and morality have ceased to exist.

We therefore must all come back to the principle that Germany must be beaten *by force of arms*. To this all our energies must be exerted. In no circumstances must there be a conference until we are in a position to dictate terms by virtue of an established and recognized military superiority. Better no peace at all than a premature peace, a peace by collective bargaining, a peace by compromise—for a compromise means defeat. No man has ever compromised with his conscience or with his honor without paying the price of ignominy, and it is not otherwise with a nation. Our desire for peace

for the sake of peace is in every way laudable and to our own credit. But this desire must not be permitted to lead us into the path of opportunism and outweigh our duty to future generations. This duty is plainly visible, clear-cut, well defined. To its full performance we must dedicate all that we are, all that we have. Germany must not be permitted to storm the citadels of Christianity that she may erect on the altar of the Church of Christ the monstrous idol of her own materialistic ambition—a world dominion.

THE END.



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